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ABSTRACT 
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (ESDP)  
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY 
 
ÖZKÖSE, ÖMER FARUK 
M.A. In International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
July 2002, 158 pages 
 
The “European Security and Defense Policy” is an evolving process. Since the 
Maastricht Treaty (1991), the European Union members have been trying to constitute a 
common security and defense policy within the framework of Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, second pillar of the European Union. The efforts to create “separable 
but not separate” European forces within NATO have increased speed in the last years 
and changed direction toward creating an independent ESDP with an autonomous 
military capability. To some extent, this new transformation concerns some non-EU 
European NATO members, such as Turkey, as well as non-European NATO allies, such 
as the US. 
The French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998), a turning point, has deeply 
changed the discussions about the European security. The impact of the latest 
developments on Turkey’s position in the European security system and on Turkey’s 
security policies is significant. Turkey wants to have some institutional links to 
European Security and Defense Policy in order to take part in the decisions on the 
matters that could affect Turkey’s vital national security interests. Turkey always points 
out that the European security cannot be accomplished properly without Turkey’s 
contributions. In this regard, it should be kept in mind that Turkey is one of the major 
actors which may have direct or indirect influence over European security matters since 
its membership in NATO; geographical location; its historical ties in the Balkans, in the 
Middle East and in the Caucasus; and its strategic relationship with the United States. 
 
 
Keywords: Turkey, European Security, ESDI, ESDP, Euro-Atlantic.  
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ÖZET 
AVRUPA GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI (AGSP) 
VE TÜRKİYE ÜZERİNE ETKİLERİ 
 
ÖZKÖSE, ÖMER FARUK 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
Temmuz 2002, 158 Sayfa 
  
 
“Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası” gelişmekte olan bir süreçtir. Avrupa 
Birliği üyeleri, 1991 Maastricth anlaşmasından beri, AB’ nin ikinci saç ayağı olan Ortak 
Güvenlik ve Dış Politikası çatısı altında bir ortak savunma ve güvenlik politikası 
oluşturmaya çalışmaktalardır. NATO içerisinde “ayrılabilir fakat ayrı olmayan” bir 
Avrupa gücü oluşturma çalışmaları son yıllarda hız kazanmış olup, otonom bir askeri 
güce sahip bağımsız bir AGSP olma yönünde değişikliğe uğramıştır. Bu yeni değişim, 
Türkiye gibi AB üyesi olmayan NATO üyesi ülkeleri olduğu kadar Amerika Birleşik 
Devletleri gibi Avrupalı olmayan NATO müttefiki ülkeleri de belli bir seviyede tedirgin 
etmektedir. 
Bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilen 1998 yılındaki Fransız-İngiliz St.Malo 
deklerasyonu Avrupa Güvenliği konusundaki tartışmaları önemli ölçüde değiştirmiştir. 
Son yıllardaki gelişmelerin Türkiye’nin Avrupa güvenlik sistemindeki yerine ve 
Türkiye’nin güvenlik politikalarına etkisi dikkat çekicidir. Türkiye kendi hayati ulusal 
güvenlik endişelerine etki edecek konularda alınacak kararlarda söz sahibi olmak için 
Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ile bazı kurumsal bağlar kurmak istemektedir. 
Türkiye, kendisinin katkıları olmadıkça, Avrupa güvenliğinin tam olarak 
sağlanamayacağını her zaman dile getirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’nin NATO 
üyeliği; coğrafik konumu; Balkanlar, Ortadoğu ve Kafkaslarla olan tarihsel bağı; ve 
Amerika Birleşik Devletleriyle olan stratejik ilişkileri nedeniyle, Avrupa güvenlik 
konularında önemli ölçüde dolaylı ya da dolaysız etki edebilecek başlıca ülkelerden biri 
olduğu her zaman göz önünde tutulmalıdır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Avrupa güvenliği, AGSK, AGSP, Avrupa-Atlantik. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
This study is an attempt firstly to analyze the evolution of the European security 
architecture from the Cold War period to the present day, and its possible impacts on 
Turkey in terms of defense and security. The main objective of this study is to explore 
the reasons and motives behind the emerging European security structure, and its 
outcomes for both the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). In this context, the national interests and driving forces behind the EU 
members; the current debates that cover recent developments affecting European 
defense; and the main controversies and challenges about the creation of a military 
foundation were examined from a causal perspective. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, the European Union members have been 
trying to develop a common foreign and security policy as one pillar of the European 
Union unification process. Efforts to create “separable but not separate”1 European 
forces within NATO have accelerated in the last years in the direction of creating an 
autonomous “European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).” Therefore many policy 
concerns came to light. This thesis attempts to explore this process in detail. 
The developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the 
French-British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have changed the discussion of an all-
European force. This profound change in the British policy toward the ESDP has 
                                                 
 
1 The term “separable but not separate” was first used by former US Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher in 1992, and then the term entered into official NATO language at the 1994 Brussels Summit. 
See the Brussels Declaration of the North Atlantic Council, 11 January 1994, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.nato.int>. 
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initiated what may be called the “St. Malo Process.” This process not only accelerated 
the move toward a more “autonomous” European security and defense posture but also 
started an extensive discussion about the feasibility of such a force, its possible impact 
on the future of NATO and on the transatlantic relationship. This thesis examines the 
fundamental dynamics and driving forces which started the St. Malo process.   
This thesis also examines the impact of the latest developments on Turkey’s 
position within the European security system and Turkey’s security policies. Because of 
its geostrategic position, Turkey has been a strategic partner for both European countries 
and the United States (US) for a long time. Although the end of the Cold War changed 
Turkey’s strategic importance for European security in terms of collective defense, 
Turkey is still an important actor in stabilizing the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East, and the Caucasus, in a word, the most complex and risky region of the 
world.  
Turkish vital national security interests force it to be a part of a new European 
security system and of security arrangements in the post-Cold War era. Turkey, even 
though a non-EU state, explicitly wants to have some institutional links to European 
Security and Defense Policy that would permit it to influence the decision-making 
process on matters affecting Turkey’s interests directly. Turkish exclusion from a 
European security system, if coupled with its political marginalization from the 
European unification process, could lead Turkey to pursue its interests unilaterally. This 
could create strains in the relations between Turkey and Europe. Turkey’s integration 
into the new European security system is essential for Turkey, but equally essential for 
Europe and North America. This thesis explores the concerns of Turkey as well as its 
3 
possible assistance to ESDP and suggests that European security cannot be provided 
without Turkey.  
The thesis has two main sections. The first section, covering the first, second and 
third chapter, examines the evolution of ESDP and its position vis-à-vis the US, Russia 
and the non-EU European NATO states, while the second section discusses, in chapter 
four, the impact of ESDP on Turkey’s position in the European security system and the 
Turkish security policies.  
Chapter 1 provides information about the European security during the Cold War 
period. The chapter comprises a brief examination of the evolution of the idea to develop 
a European security system since the attempt of the European Defense Community 
(EDC) in the early 1950s to the EU efforts of the 1990s.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the latest developments that have occurred in the post-Cold 
War period. Chapter 2 discusses the circumstances leading to the idea of a European 
force that would deal with contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo. It further discusses 
the position of the EU members vis-à-vis ESDP and their driving forces in the latest 
developments. This chapter also emphasizes the main variations in the perspectives 
among key EU member states in the field of defense and security, and examines the 
main controversies and challenges about the creation of a military foundation. It focuses 
on the differences of national aims and objectives about the new EU security structure. 
Chapter 3 discusses US policy toward ESDP since this policy would have a 
considerable impact on the fate of ESDP. Chapter 3 also discusses the perspectives of 
Russia, and non-EU European NATO states on ESDP from the point of their national 
security concerns and Euro-Atlantic security considerations.  
4 
While the first three chapters provide a general overview of the factors affecting 
the realization of ESDP and analyze the latest developments, the last chapter deals 
particularly with Turkey’s role and its position in the European security system and the 
impact of the latest developments on Turkey. Chapter 4 investigates Turkey’s place in 
the European security system and its strategic importance for regional as well as global 
security. The chapter gives a general overview of Turkey’s commitments to Europe’s 
defense and security and examines Turkey’s policy toward ESDP and if realized, the 
possible impact of ESDP on Turkey. It also touches upon Turkey-EU relations 
particularly stressing the triangular relationship between the EU, Turkey and the US. 
Turkey as a member of NATO has been a part of the European security system 
for nearly 50 years, and it still regards being a part of the European security system as 
essential for its security interests. However, Turkey has growing concerns about its 
position in the changing architecture of the European system and is attempting to secure 
a place in the new system. This chapter examines how these changes in the European 
security system could affect Turkey, what concerns it has, what contributions it could 
provide for European security, and what the consequences for Turkey and Europe could 
be if Turkey were excluded from the new security arrangements. The thesis concludes 
with the presentation of its findings about the feasibility of ESDP and its possible impact 
on Turkey. 
The methodology used in this study is mostly descriptive and explanatory. A 
literature review was made, since there are many specific sources about the topic. A 
qualitative analysis of primary sources, including communiqués, treaties, and transcripts 
of government policy statements; and of secondary resources, such as scholarly and 
journalistic analyses of core issues in books, journals, newspapers - and articles 
available on World Wide Web (Internet) was made.  Additional research on the topic has 
been done by interviews at the related Turkish General Staff Departments.  
5 
CHAPTER 1 
 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY 
AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI)  
 
Throughout history, the maintenance of security, peace and stability, and the 
safeguarding of common values have always been major concerns for all states and 
alliances, which emerged of the necessity to preserve the security of their members2. 
The idea of a secure and integrated Europe was not born in the second half of the 
twentieth century. There have been many attempts to unite Europe by using force. 
Charlemagne, Napoleon and Hitler are the names readily cited in that respect. However, 
a peaceful road to European integration could only be found in the post-World War II 
era3. Therefore, a discussion of contemporary and future policy trends in European 
defense and security should begin by a glance at the post-World War II or even the Cold 
War period in history.  
To understand the emerging security structure of Europe, the origins of the 
initiatives that try to create an independent European security policy and the evolution of 
the new security structure should be carefully explored with its main frameworks. This 
chapter comprises a concise examination of the idea to develop an independent 
European security system from the attempt of the European Defense Community (EDC) 
                                                 
2 Ömür Orhun, "European Security And Defense Identity-Common European Security And Defense 
Policy: A Turkish Perspective", Perceptions, Volume V, No.3, Sept.-Nov.2000, Available [Online] <  
www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/  
3 Esra Çayhan, "A Europe For All”, Perceptions, Volume V, No.1, June-August  2000, Available [Online] 
< www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/  
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in the early 1950s to the efforts of the late 1980s. In this scope, this chapter intended to 
give the main lines of security structure of Europe in the Cold War  period and major 
events of the ESDI process from a causal perspective, the process that led to Maastricht 
(1991) by examining why and how this new European consensus on defense and 
security issues came about.  
In the beginning of this chapter, the focus will be on the Cold War  world 
security order, particularly Europe, and the factors which set up the boundaries of 
European security. Then some initiatives such as European Defense Community, 
Western European Union (WEU), and European Political Cooperation (EPC) will be 
inspected. Finally, the developments in the 1980s until the end of the Cold War  period 
or the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) will be examined to 
explain the transition in the framework of European security. The main objective of this 
chapter is not to analyze all the initiatives in the security field, but to reveal the main 
objectives and characteristics of the European security cooperation efforts in the Cold 
War era.  
1.1.     World Security Structure during the Cold War:  
The settlement of Westphalia (1648) is accepted as the foundation stone of the 
modern nation-state and the international system. It brought about the collapse of the 
authority of the church, and the closing of the decentralized political power of feudal 
Europe4. During the Cold War, the security and defense policies of states, particularly 
Western European states, were to a large extent formulated according to the logic of the 
Westphalian model of which basic elements are sovereign states that had supreme  
                                                 
4 Adam Watson, “The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis”, (New 
York: Routlege, 1992), p.186 
7 
power in the ruling of their internal affairs and were independent of any external 
authority in their own geographical boundaries5.  
The Second World War altered the relationship between Europe and the world. It 
caused a shift in power away from the European empires, which had dominated world 
politics for 500 years, towards the global influence of the new superpowers, the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The war also triggered the process of decolonization across 
the world, and over one hundred states were liberated between 1946 and 1984. At the 
end of the Second World War, Europe became divided as eastern and western across the 
Elbe in Germany. The division of Germany was to be reflected in Europe and most of 
the world for the next four decades. The hot atmosphere of the Second World War 
rapidly froze into a Cold War between the two victorious armies of the United States and 
the Soviet Union in a condition known as ‘bipolarity’6.  
During the Cold War, the concept of security in Europe was more or less 
concerned with military-related issues, and dominated by the East-West confrontation. 
Security policies concentrated on matters such as defense, deterrence, alliance-
management with allies, and confidence-building with adversaries7. The structures and 
dynamics of the security order can only be understood in the context of the East-West 
conflict in Europe. The East-West conflict was the result of a process in which the basic 
elements of the motive forces of the post-war European security system were involved. 
                                                 
5 Helene New Sjursen , “Forms of Security Policy in Europe”, ARENA Working Papers: WP 01/4, 
Available [Online] < www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp01_4.htm > 
6 Richard Sakwa and Stevens Anne, Contemporary Europe, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 
pp.187-188 
7 William Park and G.Wyn Rees, Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War  Europe, (London: Longman, 
1998), p.11 
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These basic elements can be summarized as superpower rivalry, ideological antagonism, 
traditional great power rivalries, national-ethnic conflicts, and the arms race8. 
East-West division of Europe lead to tension and often to fear of a war. This 
resulted in Europe becoming the most heavily armed region of the world. In many 
respects, the Cold War was a very hazardous time. There was always a fear of nuclear 
war involving both of the superpowers which developed many types of massive nuclear 
weapons. This meant millions of casualties and devastated survivors9. Both sides had all 
the military means to annihilate the other. But, because of the so-called second-strike 
capability10 of the superpowers, it was almost impossible to carry out such a surprise 
attack in order to disarm the other. Therefore the fear of a nuclear catastrophe served 
well the purpose of a ‘perfect deterrent’11. A nuclear war, the worst conceivable scenario 
was also the least probable one. During the Cold War, nuclear arms control established 
an extremely important means for the strengthening of the international security. Thus 
nuclear weapons have obtained the function of deterrence, prevention of use of the 
nuclear weapon and military force in general against each other. The nuclear arms 
control during the Cold War was understood as a set of rules, accepted by the two 
superpowers, to ensure that their competition would not result in a mutual total 
destruction. The mechanism of a mutual nuclear deterrence was the basis for strategic 
stability in the period of the Cold War between the US and the USSR12.  
                                                 
8 Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price, European Security Beyond the Cold War , (London: SAGE Publ., 1991), pp.3-7 
9 Ibid, p.202 
10 Second-strike capability means the ability to survive after a first strike of enemy with sufficient 
resources to deliver an effective counterstrike; it is generally associated with nuclear weapons.  
11 Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “America’s war, Turkey’s worry: A shift from frontline to fault line”, Insight 
Turkey, Vol.3, Number 4, Oct.-Dec. 2001, p.10 
12 Sergey Rogov, "The Prospects For Nuclear Arms Control In The Multipolar World", Available [Online] 
< www.isn.ethz.ch/security/forum/workshop5/workshopD.htm > 
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Briefly, the Cold War system was notable for its clarity. The Soviet Union 
dominated Eastern Europe in military, political, economic and social terms while 
seeking with its armed forces to maintain a capability quickly to overrun Western 
Europe in the event of war. The West for its part formed a successful alliance based on 
the US to deter Soviet aggression and, if necessary, to defend against it. In this period, 
European security was mainly concerned with the containment of the Soviet Union13. 
The system endured even with various challenges including several crises over Berlin, 
the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises of 1956 and 1968 respectively, the French 
withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO after 1967, and a more or 
less continuous technological and quantitative arms race14.   
1.2.   The Developments of European Security Initiatives: 
The security system which developed in Europe after 1945 was fundamentally 
different from that which had previously existed, and was constructed in a radically 
transformed political, military and economic context. At the beginning years of the Cold 
War period, the emerging rivalry between the US and the USSR, the need for an 
effective control over German rearmament, the poor economies of the European 
countries and disparities among their national priorities were the main factors which set 
up the scope of security cooperation in Europe. In addition to these main factors, in 
subsequent years, burden-sharing debates in NATO, competition between Britain and 
                                                 
13 The term containment describes the foreign policy strategy pursued by the United States after the 
Second World War. George F. Kennan, a diplomat and U.S. State Department adviser on Soviet affairs, 
introduced the term into the public debate. In his famous article in the foreign policy magazine, Foreign 
Affairs, X-article, Kennan suggested a "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies." The Strategy of Containment found its first application in the Truman Doctrine of 
1947, which guaranteed immediate economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. See for further 
information at < http://www.nuclearfiles.org/strategy/containment.html > 
14 Hugh Miall, Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation, (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994), pp.166-167 
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France for leadership in Europe, problems in NATO consultation and decision-making 
procedures were the essential issues which impinged on security initiatives15. 
The history of European integration started with defense. The integration of 
security and defense can be referred to Europe’s initial starting point. The concept of a 
European security and defense policy has been on the European agenda since World 
War II. The Treaties of Dunkirk (1947), and especially of Brussels (1948), were 
primarily initiatives to establish a security community which would throw out any 
further possibility of war16. The defensive treaties of Dunkirk and Brussels both pointed 
out that European security could and should essentially be underwritten by the European 
powers themselves. However, in a very short time, the European security context had 
been radically transformed by the inception of the Cold War and the emergence of 
Soviet Union as the main threat to peace.  
This change in security order had two main consequences. First, it was rapidly 
implicit that the European ‘powers’ had no adequate power to secure their own security. 
After the World War II, France was in an unwinnable colonial war in Indochina; Britain 
was in an economically terrible situation; Germany was in ruins; Italy and Spain were 
also badly destroyed. The Europeans had some initiatives to organize their economic 
resources, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1951. The ECSC was a basis for cooperation between European states 
on economic matters17. But they were not able to defend themselves. Second, it was 
                                                 
15 For a comprehensive analysis of the subject, see Gülnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security 
Cooperation, 1945-1991, (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp.59-68 
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equally obvious that European security could only effectively be guaranteed by the US, 
which was keenly invited by France and Britain to enter into an Atlantic alliance18.  
1.2.1. The 1950s: The emerging European security structure: 
The purpose of the French-British Dunkirk Treaty (1947), a bilateral mutual 
defense pact, was to deal with the possibility of the revitalization of German nationalism 
and Soviet purposes in the east Europe19.  
Subsequent to Dunkirk Treaty, the Brussels Treaty on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense signed on March 17, 1948 marked a 
milestone in the development of security and defense in Europe. Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were the ‘Five’ signatory 
nations. By demonstrating their persistence to work together, the states of Brussels 
Treaty helped to overcome the unwillingness of the United States to participate in the 
emerging European security arrangements20. The Brussels Treaty can also be articulated 
as the initiator of the ‘Atlantic alliance’.  
The negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of an 
Atlantic alliance began in December 1948. The members of the Washington working 
group, (the US, Canada, and the Five), invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and 
Portugal to negotiations in March 1949. Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 
April 4, 1949 by 12 states of the North Atlantic Community. The main driving factors of 
the alliance were the Soviet threat and the emerging bipolar system. At the beginning, in 
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NATO, the emphasis was on joint defense planning, and the restructuring and 
reestablishment of European Armies. NATO was intended to perform primarily four 
tasks: The first was to promote collective defense posture against the Soviet Union. The 
second was to encourage Western Europeans for their security so to make them assume 
responsibility for their own security and therefore enhance alliance burden-sharing. The 
third was to strengthen and expand the international community based on democratic 
principles, individual liberty, and the rule of law in a peaceful international society. The 
last task was to build necessary institutional structures to serve the accomplishment of 
these duties21. 
By signing the Brussels Treaty (1948), European leaders considered creating a 
completely European integrated military force. But the demands of sovereignty and the 
‘sheer complexity’ of European security problems, including early German rearmament 
and the need for a transatlantic alliance, devastated the European Defense Community, 
the first attempt at defense integration in the early 1950s22.  
 In May 1952, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the three 
Benelux states signed the European Defense Community Treaty, motivated by the 
Pleven plan, named after French Defense Minister, Rene Pleven. In 1950, he called for 
the creation of a European Army. The EDC was designed to save resources, to improve 
effectiveness, and to limit the power of Germany. The French believed that the German 
rearmament and a national army could only be acceptable if it were within a 
supranational body, like the EDC, in which the German forces would be integrated to 
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and controlled by a European Army. The EDC would operate under a European defense 
minister, who would be responsible to the European Assembly and a European Council 
of Ministers and have a common budget23. 
However, the integration of defense into a supranational system was not an easy 
matter for the 1950s Europe. Despite the strong support and pressure of the US, which 
hoped the EDC would support NATO by strengthening Western European unity and by 
increasing the efficiency of inadequate European resources allocated for defense24, the 
project died in 1954, ironically by the hands of the French who had suffered the 
humiliating loss in Indochina and worried about France's place in Europe opposite a 
resurgent Germany25. Therefore the project was ended by the country that had originally 
proposed the idea. The EDC's defeat assured that Europe would be more dependent on 
NATO and the military commitments of both the US and the rearmed West Germany, 
which was admitted into NATO in May 1955 by the Paris Agreement. Although the 
EDC project failed the notion of having an all-European force and transatlantic alliance 
never died. Most of these discussions were initiated by France, which has always been in 
support of a Europe and its force more independent from the US. 
The failure of the EDC changed the route of the integration studies of Europeans. 
The process of integration under the authority of a political union was split into mainly 
two separate directions: the process of European security cooperation, and the process of 
economic integration. Therefore economic integration became a continuation of the 
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European integration process while European Security cooperation, on the other hand, 
found itself in a more complex and problematic situation26. 
At a special conference organized in London in September 1954, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Italy were invited to join the Brussels Treaty. The conclusions 
of the conference were formalized by the Paris Agreements, signed in October 1954. 
Paris Agreements modified the Brussels Treaty and created Western European Union as 
a new international organization by joining the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. 
The WEU was created as a ‘stop-gap measure’ between the failure of the European 
Defense Community initiative and the problem of accepting Germany into NATO in the 
face of French objections27. 
During the Cold War, the WEU served primarily as a mechanism to reassure 
West Germany's neighbors and Alliance partners that German’s military capabilities 
were under control. But the weak WEU, most of its security functions transferred to 
NATO,  could not achieve any further goals and could not provide for an authoritative 
solution to the problems. Up until 1984,  WEU had largely been an inactive institution, 
and its role and functions remained unclear. By the end of the 1950s NATO became the 
main foundation in the European security system.  
1.2.2 The 1960s-1970s: The changing East-West relations, and ‘Détente’ 
The entry into force of the modified Brussels Treaty was also the beginning of a 
period of transition in the European security system. The Cold War lost some of its bitter 
intensity. Both Western Europe and Eastern countries had largely got rid of the 
                                                 
26 Gülnur Aybet, The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945-1991, (London: Macmillan, 
1997), pp.82-83 
27 See further information Gülnur Aybet, “NATO’s Developing Role in Collective Security”, SAM Papers, 
No.4/99, available at < www.mfa.gov.tr > 
15 
difficulties of the post-war years. The security relations and alliance structures, which 
determine the European security system in general, were for the most part arranged by 
the late 1950s. This gave the post-war order on the continent a growing sense of 
stability. Therefore, Europe had a quite stable and predictable security framework. The 
two stable military and economic alliance systems faced each other. The two 
superpowers continued to play a dominant role within bipolar world order, and the 
whole system was strengthened by nuclear deterrence. There were some attempts in both 
sides to modify the relationships, but there was no significant attempt at fundamental 
change28.  
On the basis of the stability and growing confidence, there was a new motivation 
to realize some sort of rapprochement and understanding between two alliance structures 
in Europe. This established common understandings in East-West relations. Especially 
after the death of Stalin, both sides opened their minds to accept the realities of the post-
war world. During this period, with the lessening of East-West tension in Europe, the 
atmosphere began to transform from the Cold War to a new phase, ‘détente’. 
1.2.2.1 Transatlantic tensions: The Nuclear issue and burden-sharing 
With the emerging of Europe as a new power, especially in terms of economy, 
the content of the debates turned towards the issues of ‘nuclear sharing’ and ‘burden 
sharing’. Europeans were not satisfied with complete dependence on the US nuclear 
deterrence. They were always doubtful about the validity of the US nuclear assurance 
especially in a situation which did not expose a direct threat to the US. They were also 
unconvinced about the US nuclear umbrella to deter the Soviet conventional threat in 
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case of a limited strike in Europe. But, on the other hand, they were willing for the US 
contribution to their defense.  
A new nuclear strategy of ‘flexible response’ which was based on both 
conventional and nuclear response instead of ‘massive retaliation’29, proposed by Robert 
McNamara, the US Defense Minister, increased the concerns of Europeans on US 
nuclear assurance. This new strategy was a result of acquisition of capability of Inter 
Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) by the Soviets with the launch of SPUTNIK 
satellite in 1957. The response firstly at conventional and tactical nuclear level without 
escalating to a nuclear war was the essence of flexible response. According to 
Europeans, unless the US considered that the threat will be on its own territory, Europe 
could be the theatre of war. This also accelerated the efforts of Britain and France in 
building up nuclear capacity. Both Britain and France developed their own nuclear 
forces in the 1960s. 
The contribution of the Europeans to their defense was another problem in this 
period. It was inevitable when NATO was founded in 1949 that the US would bear a 
proportionately larger share of the defense burden than a rebuilding Western Europe. 
The Korean War in 1950 convinced the US to deploy more troops in Europe to prevent a 
Soviet attack against its European allies. By late 1952, US troop levels in Europe had 
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increased to 346,00030. But as the years went on and Europe recovered, the calls for 
Europe to bear a greater share of its own defense grew louder, particularly in the US 
Congress31.  
Americans were displeased by the European’s insufficient monetary contribution 
to defense matters, on the other side; the Europeans appeared reluctant to expend more 
money. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, European allies made many proposals in order 
to play a greater part in NATO by creating a separate ‘European Pillar’. On the US side, 
these attempts were means to present the disputes over finances and burden sharing to 
the public; on the European side, the projects concentrated on creating greater balance in 
influence and leadership32. 
Between 1967 and 1968, the US administration increased its pressure on 
Europeans to cooperate more in defense efforts. As a result of these pressures, 
EUROGROUP was established without the participation of France, in 1968. The 
purpose of EUROGROUP was to support coordination and cooperation in equipment 
and procurement programs. Europeans were careful not to create an image of complete 
European self-reliance; for fear that this would in itself produce a rationale for the 
reduction of the US troops in the continent33. However, the Americans did not intend to 
create an independent and powerful infrastructure for the Europeans but to reduce the 
US expenditures and to keep continuance of arms transfers to the Europe.  
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EUROGROUP accomplished little success. It tried to achieve its goals by 
initiating programs like the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) and 
supporting initiatives of NATO, such as Long Term Defense Improvement Plan (LTDP). 
EUROGROUP later became the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) in 1976 
which was established with an increasing emphasis on armaments in order to encourage 
cooperation in arms planning and procurement among the European NATO allies, to 
promote transatlantic armaments cooperation, and to include France in defense matters, 
which was removed from the military structures of NATO in 1966.  
1.2.2.2 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
After the failure of the EDC in the 1950s, during the détente period, the idea of 
political cooperation was relaunched by the Britain, Denmark and the Ireland at the EU 
summit in The Hague, in 1969. This initiative led to the establishment of European 
Political Cooperation in 1972. Cooperation on foreign policy matters and coordination 
of foreign policies of member states were arranged on the basis of EPC, giving a 
political dimension to the European Community's rising economic importance. The main 
force to establish a political cooperation was the growth of the European regional and 
economic system, and its desire to show its potential weight in international arenas. The 
objectives were to produce common understanding about major issues of international 
politics by exchanging information and discussing regularly, and to enhance solidarity 
among the member states by harmonizing views, attitudes and joint actions34.  
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EPC was outside and independent of the formal European Community (EC)35 
structures, and defense and security issues were not the concerns of EPC. The idea of a 
new European political union including security and defense policies re-emerged by the 
Tindemans Report of 1975. Tindemans Report projected a fundamental change in the 
structure of European political cooperation. The political commitments of EPC were to 
be binding the member states. The report was discussed by the EC and rejected by 
Ireland and Holland, by reason of their national concerns about creating a unity together 
with security and defense matters36. 
1.2.2.3 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)  
The highpoint of the détente process came in 1975, with the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act. In 1973, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe first 
met in Helsinki, attended by the representatives of 35 states, all European states except 
Albania, and Canada and the US. The Conference came up in a new climate created by 
the willingness of West Germany to recognize the existence of East Germany as a 
separate state, by the desire for détente and disarmament, and by the tendency to resolve 
some of the matters that had remained outstanding since 1945, and to improve economic 
relationships37. The outcome of the first meetings was the conclusion of the Helsinki 
Final Act in 1975. Although it had no binding force in international law, it was a 
document of great political importance, and it is generally recognized that the principles 
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embodied in the Final Act are compulsory for the participating states. Its main issues 
that could serve as a basis of relations among European countries are political-military 
confidence building measures, human rights, and scientific, cultural, and educational 
cooperation38. 
The CSCE process had a number of positive effects on the subsequent 
development of the European security system. It gave the small and medium-sized states 
a larger voice in the discussion on European security, and encouraged them to play a 
more prominent and constructive role in the European security system. It also reinforced 
a sense of a common European identity, especially in East Central and South-Eastern 
Europe. It remained a powerful symbol of the commitment of all 35 participating states 
to the lowering of tension and promotion of cooperation across the ideological and 
political divide in the 1980s39. 
In short, European Security cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s occurred as a 
necessity, resulting from a side effect of external conditions such as the burden-sharing 
debate and the nuclear issue. The 1960s and 1970s reaffirmed NATO as the main 
security forum for Western Europe and established efforts to create an effective 
European participation in Allies politics. By means of the experiences of cooperating 
within NATO, the Western European allies built common ground concerning security 
and defense issues, and therefore indirectly reinforced European security cooperation. 
On the other hand, this period also underlined transatlantic tensions over the 
management of East-West relations40. 
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  1.2.3 The 1980s: Revival of the debate on the European security 
By the early 1980s, the EC had got rid of economic difficulties and internal 
contradictions in most cases. This left behind a requirement for a renewal of political 
will and the strengthening of existing institutions. The consensus on the economic field 
created a new activity for cooperation in the political field41. An outstanding example in 
this respect concerned the initiative by the Foreign ministers of Germany and Italy, 
Genscher and Colombo, in 1981.  
1.2.3.1 The ‘Genscher-Colombo’ plan 
The main objective of the Genscher-Colombo plan was to produce a common 
security approach by linking the issue of the European security to the EPC process, to 
strengthen the EPC by linking it more closely to the EC, and to increase the political 
weight of EC42. Security was for the first time declared as a legitimate concern of EPC 
by the London report on October 1981. It was put into words by the draft European Act 
on November of the same year. It called for the coordination of security policy, a 
common foreign policy and the bringing of EC and the EPC processes under the 
European Council43. However, the Genscher-Colombo plan proved to be unacceptable 
for most other participating states. The result was the Solemn Declaration on the 
European Union in 1983, a considerably toned down version of the original proposal by 
Genscher and Colombo, and was the statement of status-quo. Despite the strong political 
will and pressure, to inject incorporation of security into the EC was not accomplished. 
                                                 
41 Gülnur Aybet, op.cit., p.134-135 
42 Ramses A. Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional 
Perspective, (Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.7 
43 Gülnur Aybet, op.cit., pp.135-136 
22 
The unwillingness of the EC member states to change the status-quo, and the fear of 
undermining NATO were the major reasons for failure. 
1.2.3.2 "Dual Track" policy of NATO 
At the beginning of this period, significant developments on the nuclear policies 
of both the US and the USSR came about. By the late 1970s the Soviet Union had 
greatly improved its military capabilities, and began replacing older intermediate-range 
SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with a new intermediate-range missile, the SS-20. This 
replacement was perceived as a qualitative and quantitative change in the European 
security structure. The SS-20 was mobile, accurate, and capable of being concealed and 
rapidly redeployed. The SS-20s with a 5,000 kilometer range permitted it to cover 
targets in Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and, from bases in the eastern 
Soviet Union, most of Asia, Southeast Asia, and Alaska44.  
NATO responded in December 1979 by adopting its ‘Dual Track’ policy. One 
track called for arms control negotiations between the US and the USSR to reduce 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) to the lowest possible level; the second track 
called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of 464 single-
warhead US ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and 108 Pershing II ballistic 
missiles. The initial result of this decision was a worsening of relations between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact and massive anti-nuclear demonstrations in some NATO 
countries45. Initially the Soviet Union refused to engage in preliminary talks, unless 
NATO revoked its deployment decision; however, in the second half of the 1980s, the 
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Soviet position was changed later on with Gorbachev coming to power, and negotiations 
on arms control changed positively.46  
1.2.3.3 Renewal of Franco-German security cooperation 
With the influence of NATO’s ‘Dual Track’ policy, Franco-German security 
cooperation was revived47. The main internal dynamic behind the renewal of Franco-
German security cooperation was the French concern over an antinuclear and antiwar 
tendency in Germany, following the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II missiles, in 
Germany. Through this cooperation, the French intention was to anchor West Germany 
more securely in the West. For the French, it was an instrument to become more 
concerned with European Security without re-entering the integrated military structure 
of NATO. There was also a German concern over possible reductions in French 
conventional forces which might be available for the defense of Germany. Besides, for 
Germans, it was a means to demonstrate loyalty to its ties with the West48.  
Throughout the 1980s, a valuable progress was achieved in expanding Franco-
German security cooperation by establishing a joint Franco-German brigade stationed in 
West Germany in 1987. Since the demise of the EDC in 1954, it was the most 
significant step in building a greater European Security Cooperation within the realm of 
European integration, the ultimate goal of Europeans. It was clear that EPC was not the 
suitable forum for accommodating European cooperation in foreign and security 
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policies. Therefore Franco-German cooperation became an alternative forum for the 
implementation of this goal. 
However, for other members of the alliance, especially Britain, Franco-German 
cooperation was a possible means to undermine the Alliance. According to these states, 
it created a probability of American troop withdrawals from Europe. They were all 
doubtful for Franco-German security cooperation. Consequently, Franco-German 
security cooperation could not be converted into a wider framework for European 
security cooperation in the 1980s49.  
1.2.3.4 Renewal of the Western European Union 
The necessity of a well-organized Western European security forum to be active 
and efficient on arms control negotiations enforced major European powers to look for 
new initiatives. Revitalization of the Western European Union was the most significant 
one. The establishment of Special Consultative Group (SCG) within NATO framework, 
to make required consultation before arms control talks, and the Franco-German security 
cooperation did not convince the Europeans when the Reagan Administration 
unexpectedly rejected “walk in the woods” proposal in 1982. ‘Walk in the woods’ was 
proposed by the US and Soviet chief negotiators to reach a compromise and a common 
understanding between the two positions. It was rejected by Reagan, because of the fear 
of sending a signal that Pershing deployment was expendable50. 
The WEU was reactivated in 1984 with a view to developing a common 
European defense identity through cooperation among its members in the security field 
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and strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance51. Resurrection of 
the WEU came with the adoption of the Rome Declaration, at a WEU ministerial 
meeting in 1984. The Rome Declaration aimed to strengthen military relations and 
discuss the views on defense and security issues, arms control and armaments 
cooperation, and East-West relations in general.  
“Out-of area” debates in NATO contributed to the revival process of the WEU. 
The fall of Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 had caused 
opposing approaches in NATO about the out-of-area operations. The reluctance of 
Europeans in boycotts and embargos against the Soviet invasion resulted in new 
proposals from the US Carter administration. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJTF), which would rely on forces assigned to NATO, was established in order to 
increase the reliability of alliance support in times of crisis.  
However, major European powers were in opposition to the formalization of out-
of-area cooperation within the alliance. For Britain, bilateral cooperation with the US 
and other allies, rather than formalizing out-of-area cooperation in the NATO 
framework, was more acceptable. For both Britain and France, it was not the 
globalization of East-West rivalry, as the US perceived; therefore the formulation of an 
“out-of-area” policy was seen to be unnecessary and counterproductive. Germany, on 
the other side, had constitutional constraints for its participation of these operations. But 
the worsening situation in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War forced Europeans to 
deal with the issue before changing to an issue of East-West conflict52. The problem was 
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solved by bringing the matter under the WEU, which had no geographical boundaries 
for its operations. In August and October 1987, WEU experts met in The Hague to 
consider joint action in the Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation in the oil shipping lanes 
of the region. During 1987 and 1988, the WEU member states assigned military vessels 
in the Gulf for minesweeping under the WEU flag. This action played an important role 
in increasing the importance of the organization as a security forum in Europe. 
The Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in October 1987, made 
up of Foreign and Defense Ministers of the member countries, adopted a "Platform on 
European Security Interests". The Platform defined the Western European Union's 
relations with NATO and with other organizations, and affirmed their determination 
both to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to provide an integrated Europe 
with a security and defense dimension53.  
In the transformation of the European order in the 1980s, the personality and 
impact of Mikhail Gorbachev played a pivotal role. When Gorbachev came to power, he 
introduced a number of important defense and foreign policy initiatives which ultimately 
led to the end of the Cold War. On defense, he offered unilateral and asymmetrical cuts 
in arms, opening the way towards a series of important arms control agreements with the 
West which significantly reduced the number of conventional and nuclear weapons on 
either side54.  
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1.3   Concluding Remarks: 
In the 1980s, European security cooperation emerged as a means to demonstrate 
an independent and effectual function of Western Europe to the superpowers, especially 
about nuclear arms control and out-of-area issues. As a new concept of a separate 
European identity developed in the 1980’s, the United States was reassured by the Rome 
Declaration (1984) and Hague Platform (1987) documents that the WEU would become 
the European pillar only within and consistent with the NATO alliance. It can be 
concluded that until the end of the Cold War, the concept of ESDI was defined as a 
process for the development of some sort of convergence of West European security 
interests within NATO. The major reasons were to balance American predominance, to 
better promote a policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and to tie Germany not 
only into an Atlantic, but also into a tight political European framework. It was a 
primarily political concept developed by West European member states in their search 
for greater convergence of identity of interests while not changing the basic political and 
military structure of the Alliance and Europe55. 
Although the form and configuration of the European force and the degree of 
support behind it varied somewhat from time to time, the main themes of the issue have 
always remained the same. Representing the extreme points of debate, the US tended to 
handle these efforts as a tool to increase the European share in defense expenditure and 
tried to orient them towards a form that would strengthen the transatlantic alliance. At 
the same time, the US manipulated these efforts to strengthen the US leadership in the 
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alliance and to keep its place in European arms market. France viewed the efforts as a 
way of having a more independent Europe by gradually decoupling the US from Europe. 
The attempts after the EDC to create a European defense structure, such as the WEU, the 
Franco-German Security Treaty or EUROGROUP, failed to realize the French desires. 
This was true, in general, because most Europeans feared that such a European force 
might decouple the US from Europe and put their collective defense, security and 
stability in danger. 
Because of these concerns, instead of moving toward being an independent 
European army, the development of the European security identity proceeded within the 
framework of NATO. While the WEU and the NATO’s European pillar were playing a 
subservient role, NATO represented the outer ring of European security structures. 
However, the end of the Cold War brought a new and unstable security environment in 
which the Soviet threat was gone, the dependence on the United States for European 
defense was decreased, and the need for a high readiness level for collective security 
problems such as peacekeeping and peacemaking missions was increased56. As the Cold 
War came to a close, a new definition of security and new terms for intervention 
produced additional problems. 
In the second chapter, the evolution of the new security structure in the post-Cold 
War period and the events in building independent European security system under the 
main framework of the second pillar of the European Union, Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), and the progress in security field of European integration will 
be explored.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE IN THE 
POST-COLD WAR ERA 
In the late 1980’s, the main structure of security system in Europe, which was 
built on stable, predictable and rigid Cold War system, began to change. The most 
significant and influential change in post-Cold War Europe has been the transition from 
a bloc-to-bloc confrontation to a co-operation and partnership between former 
adversaries.57 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was 
the key point to the Europeans in threat assessments, significant changes in political 
landscape of Europe that impinged on the both Western and Eastern European States 
occurred. To maintain stability in the region and to fill the authority gap that emerged in 
the central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of USSR, Western European states had 
to deal with many problems such as the reunification of two Germanys, the instability in 
newly independent states (NIS) and their transformation to democratic regimes, and 
reshaping of the European Security architecture58. Therefore, a new security architecture 
capable of putting into action the whole continent efficiently had to be created. 
Although it emerged later, European defense is, in fact, an integral part of the 
process of European integration. After trade integration with the Common Market, 
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monetary integration with a single currency, and foreign policy integration, Europe 
looks toward a common defense policy59. 
Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Union countries have been 
trying to form a common security and defense identity as one facet of the EU unification 
process. The efforts to create “separable but not separate” European forces within 
NATO have accelerated in the last four years and changed direction toward creating an 
autonomous “European Security and Defense Policy” within the framework of the EU. 
The developments in the European security structure in the aftermath of the French-
British St. Malo Declaration (1998) have profoundly changed the discussion of an all-
European force.  
In this chapter, major events in the transition of European security structure and 
key issues which set up the ground for the new European security order will be explored 
by comparing Cold War perceptions with the contemporary ones. The national interests 
and driving forces behind the EU member states, the main variations in the perspectives 
among key EU member states in the defense and security field, the main controversies 
and challenges about the creation of a military foundation, the context of the current 
debates and analyses of the most important recent developments which created the 
“European Pillar” in NATO or European Security and Defense Identity and its 
expansion as the European Security and Defense Policy within EU will be examined. 
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2.1. Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
In the beginning years of the post-Cold War period, the efforts accelerated to 
have an independent European force as one pillar of the European unification that would 
enable the European Union to become an international player on the ‘political/security 
field’ and make its voice heard. The inability of the European countries to react and to 
participate unanimously in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) in the beginning, and the 
subsequent US supremacy in the Gulf War underlined the fact that the European 
countries were in need of modifying their security institutions and creating their own 
military capabilities to face the challenges of the post-Cold War world60. 
2.1.1. European security in the early 1990s: 
In December 1991, the members of the European Community signed the 
Maastricht Treaty, transforming the European Communities into the European Union, 
and setting the goal of establishing a monetary union and a common currency, the Euro. 
The treaty was also a European response to the changing European security and defense 
environment, and a commitment to “define and implement a common foreign and 
security policy” that would eventually include the “framing of a common defense policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defense.”61   
The treaty designated the Western European Union as the organization 
responsible for implementing defense aspects of the EU’s decisions on foreign and 
security policy. The WEU members subsequently agreed (in Petersberg, Germany, in 
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1992) that they would use WEU military forces for joint operations, apart from 
questions of mutual defense, in 
• Humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
• Peacekeeping tasks, 
• Tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.62 
 
Petersberg Declaration established a policy-planning unit, some military units 
appointed as “Forces Answerable to WEU” (FAWEU), several multinational formations 
like the EUROCORPS and several other specialized units.63 The new Franco-German 
Corps—to become the core of a “Euro-Corps”—which was created just before this 
meeting, would be excellent for carrying out these tasks.64 Petersberg declaration also 
stated that it would support on a ‘case-by-case basis’, the effective implementation of 
conflict prevention and crisis management measures, including peacekeeping activities 
of CSCE and the UN Security Council.65  
2.1.2. The Combined Joint Task Force concept (CJTF): 
With these developments happening, the relationship between the WEU and 
NATO caused worries in the United States. Reflecting these concerns, US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher warned Europeans in 1993 that “there must be separable but 
not separate capabilities” that would enable Europeans to conduct such tasks66. US 
officials in NATO also maintained this approach. Additionally, during the preparation 
period of the Brussels summit (1994), at an informal meeting of NATO defense 
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ministers in Travemünde, Germany (October 1993), the US side proposed the 
“Combined Joint Task Force” as a new Alliance concept to meet both Alliance and 
WEU force requirements for out-of-area operations by using NATO assets without 
changing the Washington Treaty. 
The CJTF concept calls for the effective integration of forces from various armed 
services (joint) and various nations (combined). The ultimate goal of this concept is to 
be employed flexibly and effectively in non-Article 5 crisis management and 
peacekeeping operations, as well as in Article 5 (collective defense) contingencies67. The 
CJTF also allowed to access to NATO resources for operations under the auspices of the 
WEU and with non-NATO states, including Partnership for Peace (PfP)68 members. 
The completion of NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces concept would pave the 
way for enabling the WEU to undertake Petersberg type operations. The CJTF 
contributed to ESDI by providing the WEU with assets and capabilities, but on the other 
hand, it assured American involvement through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
which has the right to approve each CJTF exercise. This meant continuance of 
dependence on NATO, especially US resources. This raised concerns over the possible 
veto power of the US, and about the influence of the US, since American Staff officers 
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would have to be involved in CJTF exercises at various levels to supervise the use of US 
assets.69 
The CJTF was desirable for Europeans. By accessing American assets, and 
NATO’s well established Command, Control and Communications (C3) infrastructure, 
they would decrease the defense spending and reduce the need for developing 
autonomous capabilities. But, dependency on US blockaded the solution to the problem 
of the operationalization of ESDI. CJTF can be seen both as a move to block European 
autonomy, and as a European recognition of the weakness of their military assets.70 
Nevertheless, NATO’s Brussels declaration of 11 January 1994 supported 
strengthening the European pillar of NATO through WEU. The ESDI was first declared 
in this summit. In the Brussels declaration, it was stated that the emergence of an ESDI 
would strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, while reinforcing the 
transatlantic link and would enable European allies to take greater responsibility for their 
common security and defense. It outlined the concept of “separable but not separate” 
capabilities71 to avoid costly duplications of military capabilities within the WEU, and 
established the CJTF concept as the key instrument for revising the Alliance’s military 
structures in order to deal more efficiently with non-Article 5 missions and to support 
the development of ESDI. In general, the Brussels meeting placed NATO at the center 
of European Security and established the conceptual framework for ESDI. 
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2.1.3. The Berlin meeting of NAC (1996) and Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 
In consequence of developments in the first half of the 1990s, both the United 
Kingdom and France were arriving at similar conclusions concerning the future security 
relations between the United States and Europe. This was partly as a result of their joint 
experiences on the ground in Bosnia, the growing reluctance of the United States to be 
involved in European security problems, and the fear of Congressional swings toward 
either isolationism or a new burden-sharing debate.72 Furthermore, a politico-military 
consensus also emerged in France favoring a closer link to NATO as a result of the 
requirements of interoperability, command and control procedures that came out during 
these years. On 5 December 1995, France announced its decision to return to the 
Military Committee (MC), from which it had withdrawn in 1966, and to participate in 
deliberations about NATO reform. France’s decision represented a reorientation in its 
relations with the Alliance. The needs of the post-Cold War environment forced a 
serious rapprochement for practical cooperation with the Alliance.73 
In the second half of 1995, the British government began actively searching for 
ways to create a European security and defense identity within the framework of the 
Alliance, and in an approach that would facilitate France’s return to a full military 
integration in NATO. Early in 1996, both the French and British governments proposed 
what became known as the “Deputies Proposal.”74 An American officer who is in the 
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position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has always commanded 
NATO forces in Europe. The British and French suggested that the Deputy SACEUR, 
traditionally a senior European officer, and other European officers in the NATO 
command structure, wear WEU command hats as well as their NATO and national 
command hats. This multiple-hatting procedure would, without duplication of resources 
and personnel, permit the Western European Union countries to use the NATO 
command structure to organize and to command a military operation under largely 
European auspices.75 
At the spring 1996 session of NATO ministers in Berlin, Germany, the NATO 
foreign ministers once again agreed on a plan to build a European defense pillar inside 
the NATO Alliance. It was the Berlin meeting of the North Atlantic Council, which 
sketched the objectives of the ESDI more coherently. According to the Berlin decisions, 
the ESDI would, from then on, be developed within NATO, not outside it. The Berlin 
meeting recognized that NATO had become an integral part of the emerging European 
security structure. In this context, ESDI was seen as an essential part of the general 
adaptation to meet new security challenges76. Since ESDI at the time was only a concept 
and the WEU, although an organization had no ‘teeth’ in terms of military capability, 
any development of WEU/ESDI operational capability had to be developed within and 
through NATO. This was the decision reached at the Berlin Ministerial meeting in 1996.  
The Berlin decisions established the building of ESDI within NATO to ‘enable 
all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions 
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and activities of the Alliance as an expression of shared responsibilities.’ The purpose of 
combining the ESDI with NATO’s capabilities was to give a military capability to the 
WEU’s Petersberg type operations, such as humanitarian and rescue operations, 
peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peace enforcement77. Such decisions 
would be made by consensus on a case-by-case basis, meaning there would be no 
automaticity. When appropriate, to carry out such operations, European officers in the 
NATO structure would shift from their NATO responsibilities to WEU command 
positions.78 
Additionally, as declared in the final communiqué, in order to adapt the Alliance 
to the post-Cold War roles, three fundamental objectives should be accomplished:  
• to ensure the Alliance’s military effectiveness and ability to perform 
its traditional mission of collective defense while undertaking new 
military roles;  
• to preserve the transatlantic link by strengthening NATO as a forum 
for political consultation and military cooperation; 
• to support development of an ESDI by creating the possibility for 
NATO-supported task forces to perform missions under the direction 
of the WEU nations.79  
 
In 1996, NATO also adopted the Combined Joint Task Force concept as a 
“deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific 
contingency operations,” after three years of discussion since it was first introduced in 
Travemünde (1993). Thus, through the CJTF, forces assigned to NATO and trained in 
NATO exercises could be used in conjunction with or entirely for WEU operations. This 
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linkage of the WEU’s operational role to NATO has resulted in “separate but not 
separable” capabilities, to be used either by the WEU or NATO.80  
The key phrase in establishing the NATO-WEU link was the concept of 
‘separable but not separate capabilities’. This meant that NATO had full control over the 
development of the WEU’s role in Petersberg type operations. A month before the 
Berlin decisions, an agreement was signed between the WEU and NATO on the sharing 
of intelligence. This meant that NATO intelligence, largely US intelligence, would be 
made available to WEU military staff preparing for Petersberg type contingencies. The 
ESDI’s military dimension therefore, has largely been developed on the basis of using 
NATO assets.81 
However, even after Berlin, the question was what military operations the 
European Allies could actually assume within the framework of the new arrangements. 
Despite “the hour of Europe”82 rhetoric articulated by some EU officials, the intervening 
years have demonstrated that they lack the combination of military resources and 
political will to take on operations like IFOR or SFOR in Bosnia, and the United States 
provided most of the key resources for the air war against Serbia in 1999.83 In 1997, 
when impending chaos in Albania threatened to destabilize southeastern Europe, the 
Europeans were not even able to agree on organizing an intervention under the Western 
European Union. If this had been done, the operation would have been a perfect example 
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of Petersberg-type mission, acting under the authority of the WEU for humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management and peacemaking. But, the 
Alliance solidarity within the WEU was not strong enough to trigger institutional 
support.84 Thus, instead of a WEU force, an Italian-led ad hoc coalition force (7,000 
troops from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain, and Turkey) 
intervened under the name of Operation Alba.85 All these experiences have 
demonstrated the fact that Europe does not have sufficient military capacity required to 
maintain stability on the continent.86 
In June 1997, the EU members signed the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was 
ratified by the member nations and came into force in 1999. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
covered a reference to Petersberg tasks in questions of security and defense, and did not 
contain any major changes to Maastricht in terms of the relationship between the EU and 
the WEU.87 The Treaty forecasted the enhancement of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy including the development of a Common European Defense Policy 
(CEDP).  
The Amsterdam Treaty specified that the WEU is an integral part of the 
development of the European Union and should support the EU in framing the defense 
aspects of the common foreign and security policy. Accordingly, the EU should promote 
closer institutional relations with the WEU "with a view to the possibility of the 
                                                 
 
84 Fred Tanner, “Conflict Management and European Security: The Problem of Collective Solidarity,” 
Paper prepared for the First Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP)-Yale (ISS) Seminar in Leukerbad, 
Switzerland., 21/22 August 1998, Available [Online]: 
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/securityforum/Online_Publications/WS4/Tanner.htm>  
85 Ibid. 
86 Stanley R. Sloan, Chaillot Paper-39, op.cit., p.14 
87 “The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide”, Available [Online:] 
< http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s50000.htm > accessed on December 14, 2000. 
40 
integration of the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide". The 
Amsterdam Treaty also states that the "Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications".88  
The treaty also included the creation of the position of a “High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy,” a position that was not filled until September 
1999, when former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana accepted the position.89  
2.1.4. Turning point of ESDP process: St. Malo (1998) 
In the autumn of 1998, the discussion on European defense was changed 
profoundly when British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided to support a more European 
role in defense. Blair first expressed his ideas at an informal EU summit in Pörtschach, 
Austria, in October 1998.90 Tony Blair was making a significant change in Britain’s 
traditional anti-integration policy in defense matters by announcing Britain’s willingness 
to realize an effective Common Foreign Security Policy within the framework of the 
EU, provided militarily sound, intergovernmental in nature and not damaging the 
Atlantic solidarity.91 Blair criticized that Europe’s ability for autonomous military action 
was so limited, and called for major institutional and resource improvement in order to 
make Europe a more equal partner in the transatlantic Alliance. At the Amsterdam 
Council meeting in June 1997, Tony Blair had vetoed the proposal for a phased merger 
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of the EU and WEU. Only after one year, his unexpected new approach was the sign of a 
great change in Britain’s policy toward the ESDP. 92 
Consequently, at a regular French-British Summit, Blair met with President 
Jacques Chirac at St. Malo in early December 1998. The declaration, named after this 
French resort, envisioned creating a European Security and Defense Policy with the 
means and mechanisms to permit the EU nations to act “autonomously,” should NATO 
not decide to act in some future scenario requiring military action.93 The French 
delegation reportedly had lined up support from German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
before the meeting, giving the declaration even more weight.94 The St. Malo declaration 
marked a watershed event in the ESDP process.   
The declaration emphasized the European Union’s role on the international stage 
and the need for strengthened armed forces that could react rapidly to the new risks, and 
which were supported by a strong and competitive European defense industry and 
technology. The Union had to have appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of 
situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, 
without unnecessary duplication. The declaration also pointed out the need for an 
intergovernmental institution that would enable the Union to have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use 
them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.95  
                                                 
92 Ibid., p.25 
93 Margarita Mathiopoulos and István Gyarmati, “St. Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense”, The 
Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1999, Vol. 22, Issue 4, p. 68-69. Also available [Online:] through 
EBSCOhost  
94 Stanley R. Sloan, Chaillot Paper-39, op.cit., p.16 
95 Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998, Available 
[online] at < http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai38ex.htm > Accessed on November 1, 2000. 
42 
Two fundamental things emerged from the St Malo decisions: First, that the 
WEU will be absorbed into the EU and that it will be placed under the 2nd Pillar of the 
EU structure, which is the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Second, the collective 
defense provision of Article V of the Brussels Treaty will be maintained. Another 
significant aspect emerging from the St Malo declaration was that the EU could have 
two types of ‘recourse to suitable military means: European capabilities pre-designated 
within NATO’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the 
NATO framework.’ (Parag. 3) This indicated a departure from the Berlin decisions of 
‘separable but not separate’ military capabilities and the development of ESDI within 
NATO. It also indicated a departure from the close working relationship established 
between NATO and the WEU.96  
2.1.5.  Transatlantic repercussions of St. Malo declaration: 
These developments had some effects on the other side of the Atlantic. As a 
reflection of US concerns (then) Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, formally 
declared the US Administration’s support for the initiative. For a long time the United 
States had been quite critical of Europe’s lack of military capabilities and urged them to 
increase their defense expenditures, but cautioned the Europeans against “the three D’s”: 
duplication, decoupling, and discrimination.97 Secretary Albright would also emphasize 
these concerns at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the 
St. Malo meeting.  
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According to Albright, the Allies should not ‘duplicate’ what was already being 
done effectively in NATO. This would be a waste of defense resources at a time when 
defense spending in most European nations was declining. More fundamentally, the new 
European initiative should not in any way ‘decouple’ or ‘de-link’ the United States from 
Europe in the Alliance, or the European defense efforts from those coordinated through 
NATO. This could result from a lack of candor and transparency that the United States 
feared might be an intended or unintended consequence of the new European approach. 
A tendency to “gang up on” the United States, or just the US perception of such an 
occurrence, could surely spell the end of the Alliance. Finally, Albright insisted that 
there be no discrimination against NATO Allies who were not members of the European 
Union. This point applied in particular to Turkey, but also to European Allies, Norway, 
Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, as well as Canada and the United 
States on the North American side of the Alliance.98 
In spite of these footnotes to US support for the initiative, it moved ahead, in 
parallel with NATO’s conduct of the air campaign over Kosovo, which intended to stop 
the Serbian atrocities in the province and to allow Kosovo refugees to return to their 
homes in peace. The Kosovo campaign justified and added impetus to the Blair 
initiative. When the numbers were totaled after the air campaign, the United States had 
conducted nearly 80 percent of the bombing, 90 percent of the air-to-air refueling, and 
had met approximately 95 percent of the intelligence requirements.99 From the US 
perspective, the fact that the Allies for the most part were not able to contribute to such a 
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high-tech, low casualty campaign validated the wisdom of the Defense Capabilities 
Initiative (DCI).100 The DCI, adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999, was 
designed to stimulate European defense efforts to help them reach the US levels.101 
From the European perspective, the experiences in Kosovo clearly demonstrated 
Europe’s (undesirable, and perhaps growing) military dependence on the United States, 
and the need to do something about it. 
2.1.6. The Washington summit - NATO’s new ‘strategic concept’: 
The NATO Washington summit of April 1999 identified a long list of shortfalls 
in European capabilities, and all the members agreed to remedy these deficiencies. At 
that summit, NATO welcomed the European Security and Defense Initiative as an 
important process of getting better capabilities. In collaboration with the NATO work, 
the EU would develop a plan to produce these necessary capabilities.102 A compromise 
was reached between the non-EU members and the EU members of NATO. They agreed 
that the European Security and Defense Identity would be developed within the alliance 
as declared in the 1996 Berlin decisions.103 The Alliance was supporting the Europeans 
to act autonomously; but the Alliance would retain the decision-making. According to 
“the right to first refusal”, the issues related to the ESDI would be discussed by the 
Atlantic Council, which would decide whether the subject should be practiced by the 
Alliance as a whole or left to EU autonomous initiative which could then envisage 
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taking military action with the help of NATO.104 This was clearly limiting the ESDI 
within NATO and declining the right of EU to decide autonomously. Moreover, since 
the probability of veto by a NATO non-EU member, the possible accessibility of NATO 
assets for European operations was also in doubt.105 This lessened the expectation to 
establish an effective European security and defense pillar in NATO, but, on the other 
hand, encouraged the EU efforts to build the ESDP within a EU framework.  
The new Strategic Concept recognized a continuation of the Berlin Decisions, 
including the implementation of CJTFs and the creation of CJTF nuclei Headquarters 
and role of Deputy SACEUR in supervision the use of NATO assets. On the other hand, 
NATO summit documents did acknowledge that the EU might at some point take over 
the role of the WEU in the existing NATO-WEU framework planning capabilities. 106 
2.1.7. The EU Cologne summit and Helsinki “Headline Goal”: 
In the meantime, the German EU Presidency transformed the set of national and 
bilateral initiatives triggered by the St. Malo declaration into a formal European Union 
process.107 At the Cologne EU Summit of June 1999, member states decided to give to 
the EU the necessary means to assume its responsibilities on the subject of a ‘common 
European policy on security and defense’. Furthermore, the Fifteen committed 
themselves to further develop a more effective European military. They also decided to 
establish a permanent EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and a EU Military 
Committee to make recommendations to the PSC. They also established a EU Military 
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Staff, including a Situation Center to transfer WEU assets to the EU, and they agreed to 
hold regular as well as ad hoc meetings of the General Affairs Council, including the 
defense ministers. Finally, they approved the designation of Mr. Javier Solana as High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, in line with the Amsterdam 
Treaty.108 Summit conclusions also included an Annex providing the guidelines and 
principles for strengthening of the common European policy on security and defense. 
The EU Cologne Summit pointed out two ways in which the EU could implement 
Petersberg tasks. One, by using NATO assets, which would be in reference to the Berlin 
decisions of 1996, and the other, the implementation of EU-led operations without 
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities109. 
By the end of 1999, the EU had tied a major package together based on the 
guidelines of the St. Malo statement. Javier Solana had moved from his position of 
NATO Secretary-General to the post of EU High Representative for CFSP. In addition, 
it was agreed that Solana would become WEU Secretary-General to help pave the way 
to merge the WEU within the EU, as was confirmed at Cologne. Additionally Solana 
also served as Secretary General of the EU Council.  
In Cologne, the French proposed the concept of Framework Nation, which was 
worked out as an EU-led operation without recourse to NATO assets. The idea, put 
forward by France, to develop a European identity outside NATO was confirmed in 
Helsinki in December 1999. The Helsinki European Council meeting agreed a military 
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‘Headline Goal’ involving the creation of a European armed force capable of significant 
peacekeeping, humanitarian or crisis management operations.110  
In Helsinki, the efforts on the way to a European force changed into a more 
concrete form by giving practical force to the process launched in Cologne. The EU 
members declared their determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to make 
decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and to conduct EU-led 
military operations in response to international crises.” They noted that the process “will 
avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.” In 
addition, they agreed on a series of substantial steps required to implement their political 
commitment, including: 
• cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must 
be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 
one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of 
the full range of the Petersberg tasks;  
• new political and military bodies and structures will be established 
within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary 
political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while 
respecting the single institutional framework;  
• modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the 
needs of all EU member states;  
• appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while 
respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU 
European NATO members and other interested States to contribute 
to EU military crisis management;  
• a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to 
coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the 
Union and the member states.111  
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EU leaders decided to add military muscle to Europe’s economic and financial 
power by establishing new permanent political and military bodies within the EU 
Council: 
• A standing Political and Security Committee, to deal with all 
aspects of the CFSP, including the Common European Security and 
Defense Policy (CESDP). During a military crisis, this PSC will 
exercise political and strategic direction of the operation— under 
the authority of the Council; 
• A Military Committee composed of EU Member States’ Chiefs of 
Defense, or their military representatives. The MC will give military 
advice and make recommendations to the PSC; and 
• A Military Staff (MS) to provide the Council with military expertise 
and support to the CESDP. The MS will perform early warning, 
situation assessment, and strategic planning for the EU’s conflict 
prevention and crisis management (Petersberg) tasks.112 
 
In Helsinki, the EU countries demonstrated the political will to create an 
autonomous ESDP. Consequently in Brussels in November 2000, in accordance with the 
so-called Helsinki “headline goal” the defense ministers of the EU member states took a 
major step in creating an autonomous ESDP by agreeing to provide a pool of about 
100,000 personnel, 400 combat planes and 100 warships to comprise the Euro Rapid 
Reaction Force, which would be a maximum of 60,000-strong at any time113. The 
European Union also invited nonmembers to contribute troops. On this invitation, 
Turkey offered to contribute a mechanized brigade of up to 5,000 men, 36 F-16 
warplanes, 2 transport planes and a small flotilla of ships in return for an important role 
in planning the organization's military operations.114 
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The “Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration” recognized both the need 
for further strategic capabilities and “the need to further improve the availability, 
deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, been identified 
if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied.” The 
declaration also touched upon the relations with NATO. It referred to the need for 
mutually reinforcing the EU's capability goals with the DCI without unnecessary 
duplication. It also ensured that non-EU members’ contributions would be considered to 
facilitate their possible participation in EU-led operations in accordance with the 
Helsinki and Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000) decisions. However, the declaration 
placed much more emphasis on the “preservation of EU’s autonomy in decision 
making” and the capabilities that would enable EU “to intervene with or without 
recourse to NATO assets.”115 
2.1.8. From Nice to Laeken: Making ESDP operational 
In the context of the European security framework, the decisions taken at the EU 
summit in Helsinki marked a significant change for the ESDI. With its Helsinki 
decisions, the EU moves significantly beyond the model of transatlantic partnership 
agreed at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin. One may get the impression that 
the EU, in addition to its political and economic power status, aims at gaining further 
global weight. Although the emphasis initially seemed to be on Petersberg-type conflict 
prevention and crisis management operations, the results of the Cologne, Helsinki and 
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Feira summits indicate that the EU's long-term objective is to acquire a larger domain in 
the security field, possibly leading to defense, thus reinforcing the stature of the EU.116 
The European Council meetings held in Santa Maria da Feira and in Nice (04 
December 2000) made significant progress towards making ESDP operational. Security 
and defense policy has been institutionalized, due to Article 25 of the Treaty of Nice, 
which accords a central role to the new Political and Security Committee. The PSC 
emerged as the EU’s essential security and defense organ. Two other new institutions 
were established to strengthen PSC. The first is the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC). This committee gives military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC. 
It is the highest military body established within the Council of the European Union. The 
second important institution – the European Union Military Staff – performs early 
warning functions, situation assessment and strategic planning, including identification 
of European national and multinational forces.117  
In short, the main achievements agreed upon in Nice summit were:  
• inclusion of most WEU functions and assets (except Article V 
commitments) into EU activities;  
• cementing of new Council structures;  
• arrangements for regular and deeper consultations between the EU 
and NATO;  
• detailed proposals by the EU of ways in which NATO assets might 
be used by an EU-led operation; and  
• arrangements with non-EU European NATO members and EU 
candidate countries to participate in a EU-led operation.118  
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The Göteburg European Council (June 15-16, 2001) committed to develop its 
ability to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, 
making use of military and civilian means.119 Subsequently, the European Council at 
Laeken of 14-15 December 2001 adopted a declaration on the operational capability of 
the ESDP, officially recognizing that the Union is now capable of conducting some 
crisis management operations. Interim structures established after the Amsterdam treaty 
have become permanent.120 
As a result of developments between 1998-2001, though most of the analysts 
were still using these concepts of ESDI and ESDP interchangeably, by the end of 2000, 
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ESDP became an EU project, while the ESDI was mainly a NATO one.121 Though the 
US arguments about ESDP remained the same as if it were ESDI, actually the 
developments triggered by the “Blair Initiative” substantially changed the nature of 
discussion. The Europeans had shifted the platform on which the European security and 
defense identity would be built from NATO to the EU. Europeans managed to turn what 
had begun as a NATO project (ESDI) into an EU project (ESDP). The language of 
NATO documents emphasized the capabilities and cautioned against “the three D’s”: 
duplication, decoupling and discrimination (NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
would then change the rhetoric from “the three D’s” to “the three I’s”: inclusiveness of 
all NATO allies, indivisibility of the transatlantic link, improvement of capabilities122), 
while EU documents after St. Malo emphasized the “autonomy” and the EU-only 
institutions. The Cold War circumstances that prevented Europeans from having an 
effective ESDP have substantially changed and the circumstances of the post-Cold War 
security environment seem to necessitate, to contribute and even to accelerate the 
creation of a European force rather than prevent it.         
The speed of developing an effective ESDP has been increasing. In almost four 
years, Europeans have accomplished more in security and defense areas than they had 
previously achieved in fifty years. More importantly, the inclusiveness of the ESDP is 
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unprecedented when compared to other European Union projects, such as a Single 
Market or the EMU. The experiences of the Bosnia and Kosovo wars played the role of 
a catalyst in the development of ESDP. They highlighted the Europeans' weaknesses or 
shortcomings in the areas of command and communications, intelligence gathering, 
precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, heavy airlift capacity and in-flight refueling. 
Additionally, Europeans had not enough electronic countermeasure aircraft for Kosovo-
type operations, very few laser-guidance pods, etc. Many military structures in Europe 
are outmoded, equipment is not standardized, the rate of modernization is not the same, 
and there is not enough joint acquirement at the EU level. 123 Consequently, the Bosnia 
and Kosovo wars showed that Europe has no adequate military formation to cope with 
the complexities of new security environment.  
The high level of integration and the remarkable success of the unification 
process during the 1990s played a decisive role in achieving such ambitious goals in 
ESDP. Clearly, the high level of European integration has been a greatly contributing 
factor to the speed and extent of achievements, yet there were also other specific factors 
that produced the St. Malo/Helsinki process. The first factor was the “American decision 
to tip the balance of US policy in favor of greater autonomy for the EU, primarily as a 
way of satisfying Congressional demands for burden-sharing, but also in the hope that 
this would relieve the pressure on an overstretched imperium with increasingly complex 
global security responsibilities.”124 Second was the long-standing French pressure to 
have a more autonomous European defense posture. Third was the “Blair Initiative” that 
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removed the largest stumbling block in the way of achieving an effective ESDP. And 
finally the humiliating European failures in dealing with post-Cold War security 
problems exemplified in Bosnia and reached to peak in terms of military capabilities in 
Kosovo.           
2.2 European Perspectives on ESDP: 
For decades, there has been discussion within the European Union about the 
creation of a common security and defense policy. When first debated as a feasible 
entity in 1990, ESDI had three main supporters, although for different motives, and one 
chief opponent. Those favorably eager states were France, Germany and the US, while 
the UK was generally opposed. Underlying the differences were ‘issues of national 
interests, mutual trust, threat perception, leadership, EU political integration, co-
operation with Russia, and defense expenditures’.125 Additionally, the contradiction 
between the reduction in the sovereignty of the European nation-state and the inability to 
tackle the policy implications of this in the foreign affairs and security field was an 
important motive to the reluctance of some European states concerning defense and 
security matters.126 
ESDP means different things to different member states. To some, it means a 
stronger voice, even an emerging ‘geopolitical’ unit for Europe. To others, it means a 
new basis for restructuring and modernizing a European defense capability in a more 
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robust NATO. And to some others, such as Nordic countries, it is as an opportunity to 
transform from Cold War   neutrality to international participation.127 
Europe committed itself in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty to develop a CFSP, 
including ‘the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead 
to common defense’ (Maastricht Treaty: Article J.4.1). The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty 
deepened this commitment with new political and bureaucratic structures intended to 
permit a more effective CFSP. It defined the Union’s common defense policy to include 
‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management, including peacemaking’. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU can ‘avail 
itself of the Western European Union’ (Treaty of Amsterdam: Article J.7.2-3), a defense 
club of 10 EU members which are also in NATO, to carry out these tasks.128 
In the new post-Cold War security order in Europe, there is broad agreement that 
Europeans should become more self-sufficient militarily. However, feelings are divided 
about the autonomy of a new European foreign and security policy. The big countries 
want to rebalance the established transatlantic relationship to reflect Western Europe’s 
economic power, whereas the smaller members of the EU are worried about change. 
France, Germany and Britain seriously intend to give Europe an integrated military force 
able to act independently. In this context, two positions emerged: Atlanticists vs. 
Europeanists. Also we can add one more position: Euro-Atlanticists. 
The intersection and competition of big countries’ interests largely define the 
future role and institutional personality of ESDP. So, it is significant to examine the 
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viewpoints of the French, the British and the Germans, who represent Europeanists, 
Atlanticists and Euro-Atlanticists, respectively, to express the disparities in the 
perspectives of key EU member states, concerning essential security matters.  
Atlanticists, which include Britain, Portugal, Denmark, and some Benelux 
countries, are reluctant to take steps that could undermine NATO and encourage the US 
to call its forces home. Atlanticists accepted the necessity of constructing an ESDP as 
the price to be paid for ensuring the survival of the Atlantic Alliance. The lesson which 
these countries appeared to have drawn from the events of the first half of the twentieth 
century was that the United States must be permanently locked into the structures of 
European security.129 Atlanticists are driven more by the view that Europe needs to share 
the military burden more equitably with Washington. 
The United Kingdom is a major European state, with a fundamental interest in 
Europe’s security, but with interests that are not restricted to Europe. Elsewhere, the UK 
interests are most likely to be affected by events in the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean. 130 Traditionally, the UK had opposed the idea of creating a European 
defense system autonomous from the transatlantic alliance. The UK had shared the US 
skepticism regarding initiatives that might create divisions between the US and Europe 
in the Alliance. To some extent, the opposition of the UK to any European defense 
identity outside of NATO restricted European security efforts. In the fall of 1998, 
however, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a change in this manner, and 
began to support for a EU defense role. This new British engagement and the fact that 
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NATO's air campaign in Kosovo highlighted the deficiencies in European military 
capabilities have led to advances on the road to a common European security and 
defense policy for the EU, at least at the institutional level, and a European intervention 
force.131 
In spite of European Union nations’ lack of political will and their inability to 
conduct military operations independently from NATO, the United Kingdom had an 
important reason for this change of policy. In order to shape Europe’s future consistent 
with British interests and to avoid its undesirable side effects, Britain had to remain 
engaged to the EU and had to lead the European integration process.132 Blair’s 
government viewed the “defense pillar” of the union as a suitable area to remain 
critically engaged and even, considering Britain’s “military superiority” over other 
European countries, to lead the integration of the European Union.133 Britain continues 
to view NATO and its tie to the US as crucial to balance both the prospect of German 
dominance and the efforts of the French to fashion exclusively European security 
architecture. 
On the other hand, there are the Europeanists, who call for a European initiative 
independent from the US. France basically upholds this line of argument134. France is 
motivated more by a lack of faith in Washington's commitment to Europe and is 
disturbed with a NATO dominated by the US. Many French officials describe the US as 
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a "hyperpower" and argue Europe should "constitute a factor of equilibrium" in the 
world.135  
One fundamental difference of attitude in Paris and London is about the impact 
of ESDP on Washington. While Paris considered that the emergence of a ESDP with 
teeth would consolidate and enhance a more balanced –and therefore stronger–Atlantic 
Alliance, London feared that if Europe demonstrated a serious capacity to manage its 
own security affairs, Washington would retreat into isolationism and NATO would 
eventually collapse. Despite their joint sponsorship of the St-Malo process, Britain and 
France continued to promote the two contrasting positions on Atlanticism/Europeanism, 
even though by 1999-2000 France had moved much closer to NATO and the UK had 
moved closer to Europe, thus narrowing the gap without eliminating it.136 
For the French, although the continued engagement of the US in the European 
security through NATO can provide an important hedge against the emergence of a 
unified Germany to dominant in Europe, the European institutions must take the leading 
role in European security so as to integrate Germany completely within Europe. France 
adopted the viewpoint that the main lesson of the two World Wars, as well as that of the 
Cold War, was that Europe should not remain dependent upon only the American ally 
for its security, and that it should arrange its own autonomous security structures.137  
The French have traditionally been deeply suspicious of America’s domination 
of European defense, refusing to forfeit altogether their right to fight independently, 
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either with conventional or nuclear forces, should NATO be called to arms.138  A unified 
Europe with a distinct political sketch has been always a key French objective. French 
are more eager than other Europeans to see Europe as a major geopolitical actor and a 
global power in the world. The drive toward a unified security and defense policy, 
stimulated largely by new attitudes toward Europe in London, and positive changes in 
German attitudes to European military force and France-like irritation with US 
hegemony are certain developments which support the French perspective.139 
During the Cold War period, the aim of national independence and territorial 
defense was central to French security and defense policy. Not only did France leave the 
military wing of NATO in 1966; it also built an independent nuclear force. The search 
for independence was not only directed towards the Soviet Union, but also towards 
France’s ally, the United States. France was also a strong supporter of separate European 
security and defense co-operation. European co-operation was therefore seen and 
presented as an instrument for French influence and French autonomy in Europe. 140  
With the end of the Cold War, radical transformations have taken place in French 
security and defense policy. Transformations have occurred in mainly three dimensions: 
‘to the conceptions of security; to the approaches to institutional security co-operation 
and to perceptions of France’s role in the European security system’.141 On the subject of 
the conception of security, France moved from a traditional notion of ‘territorial defense 
and national autonomy’, with a particular emphasis on the military dimensions of 
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defense, towards emphasizing ‘interdependence among states’ as an important clause for 
security.  
In light of the end of the Cold War, French officials initially argued that since 
NATO had fulfilled its primary goal of deterring Soviet aggression, then West 
Europeans should set up themselves for an American withdrawal from the continent by 
building up their own defense capability.142 But, the ineffectiveness of an independent 
ESDI naked by the Balkan crises and the high costs of building an autonomous ESDI 
forced France into a gradual return toward NATO military planning.143 France 
continued, however, to be strongly in favor of an independent European security 
capacity. The return to NATO, thus, most of all indicated a change in attitude to 
multilateral security arrangements. 
Germany, given its size and wealth, is the key to the success of any EU defense 
initiative. It fields a professional army of 233,400 soldiers (the peacetime land force 
strength)144, NATO’s largest European land force, occupies a linchpin geostrategic 
position across the Continent, with a defense budget which, at $24 billion (in 2000), is 
the seventh largest in the world, and is in every way crucial to the outcome of the 
project. Germany’s position on ESDP has been viewed positively because of the belief 
that it will make significant contributions to create a more integrated Europe.  
Germany, with its strategic location in Central Europe, its political influence and 
huge economic potential, and its proactive role within the process of European 
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integration, has followed a dual-track approach of its own. While expressing the 
importance of NATO and the role of US in European security, Germany maintained a 
noticeable commitment to further European integration initiatives. Germany has always 
strictly recommended in favor of a strong European role in security matters, with a 
bigger share of responsibility on its own, but has also been keen on avoiding any 
potential conflict with the US about the future character of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership.  
From the perspective of Germany, the political, the military, and the industrial 
sides are three fundamental aspects of European security. Kosovo made clear the need 
for powerful political structures to enable integrated crisis management. The Germans 
also perceive the creation of an efficient and competitive European defense industry as 
an essential element of the ESDP together with the military and political integration.145 
Contrary to the French case, multilateralism was the key to German security 
policy in every period of European history. According to the “principles of 
participation”, outlined by Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minster in 1994, “Germany 
will never undertake peace missions alone”. German security policy was always deeply 
integrated in multilateral units in NATO. Close integration in Western institutional 
frameworks had been a deliberate policy choice made by German chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer after the end of the Second World War, and Germany has still been supportive 
of increased security co-operation inside the EU.146  
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In short, Germany’s special interests regarding ESDP are twofold: On the one 
hand, a position that also met French demands that some progress be made towards an 
independent European security identity under EU framework. On the other hand, it 
stimulated the British fear that it jeopardize the transatlantic link institutionalized in 
NATO147. Germany, while remaining a good ally of the United States, continues to press 
out for greater integration of European defense capacity.148  
Italy, normally relied on to support the Atlanticist position, but quietly and 
without obvious keenness, has emerged as a major contributor to peacekeeping 
operations in the Balkans. Italy perceived the Blair initiative as a means to reconcile 
its Atlanticist security instincts and its European political aspirations. Above all, CESDP 
was being used in Italy as a means to reform the Army, restructure and possibly even 
increase the defense budget, and in general promote change which would otherwise have 
been politically very difficult.149 
Spain, which became a member of Eurocorps in 1994, was eager to contribute 
strong political support for an increasingly credible European military capacity. Spain 
has made sizeable military commitments to the planned European Rapid Reaction Force. 
Furthermore, Spain has been an increasingly active supporter of the European Common 
Foreign and Security policy and, attempts toward creating a well-built European 
Defense and Security Policy, while continuing to regard the Atlantic Alliance through 
NATO as the bedrock of European defense.150 
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Greece was shifting (especially since Kosovo) from a formerly NATO-centered 
position to one which was more open to weighing the advantages of European 
integration. From the perspective of Greece, ‘the CFSP should be credible, effective and 
able to respond to the threats and challenges of the post-Cold War period. It should be 
complimented by a common defense policy. The CFSP is not intended as a 
counterweight to the Atlantic Alliance (NATO), which remains the mainstay of 
European security; its role would be to assist NATO in its task’.151 
Similar developments were taking place in the Netherlands, which has 
traditionally assumed the most coherent and uncompromising of Atlanticist position. 
From the viewpoint of Netherlands, NATO is still an essential instrument for promoting 
peace, security and stability, and as such is the cornerstone of security.152 
The smaller EU members appear wary of backing an EU defense initiative which 
they fear would be a mechanism for their larger neighbors to gain a monopoly over EU 
policymaking in that area. They seem to prefer the arrangement within NATO.153  
The Benelux countries were concerned about the potential threats to the interests 
of the smaller member countries in such a system, which automatically tends to back a 
kind of directory of the bigger nations, and called, on the contrary, for stronger 
community institutions, a binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, and a directly elected 
Commission President154. 
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The transformation of the international system during the last ten years put into 
question the traditional concept of neutrality, and forced the neutral countries to adapt 
their foreign and security policies to the new international environment. Traditional 
policy positions are being reassessed among states like Austria, Finland and Sweden 
where national defense policies are defined in terms of non-membership of military 
alliances. Their traditionally active engagement with European security issues has led 
policy makers in these states to consider how best they might contribute to security in 
this new environment. A consensus among policy makers in these states appears to be 
emerging. They are committing themselves to an active security and defense role that 
does not, however, require an automatic treaty-based obligation to a mutual defense 
guarantee such as exists in NATO or the WEU.155 
From a Nordic perspective it is certainly clear that such a ‘militarization’ of the 
EU will change the security positions of the different Nordic countries. As regards 
Finland and Sweden, their statuses as non-aligned countries have to be defined in new 
ways. Especially Finland but also Sweden put much emphasis on the emerging ESDP of 
the EU, where the most important aspect was their joint initiative on the integration of 
the Petersberg Declaration into the EU treaty. Finland and Sweden stresses the 
importance of crisis management as a vital element in the defense planning.  According 
to Finnish governors, new bodies charged with crisis management will be established on 
a permanent basis.156 Although still focusing upon territorial defense and compulsory 
                                                 
155 “Rethinking National Policies”, in European Security and Defense Policy Newsletter, Institute of 
European Affairs Ireland, Issue no.1, March 2000, p.2, Available [online] 
< http://www.iiea.com/docs/200003-efspn01.pdf > 
 
156 “Contribution from the Finnish Government: Background and objectives in the IGC 2000”, Conference 
of The Representatives of The Governments of The Member States, Brussels, 7 March 2000, Available 
[online] < http://ue.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04723en.pdf.> 
65 
military service, a capacity to participate in military crisis management tasks is being 
developed as part of Finland’s defense capability. Participation in international crisis 
management is an increasingly important component of Finnish security policy, and 
Finland sees its non-alignment policy as a vital element in preserving security and 
stability in northern Europe. Accordingly, Finland is looking upon non-NATO 
membership as its contribution to security in Europe.157  
The overall aim of the Swedish security and defense policy remains the pursuit 
of non-alliance policy in times of peace, making neutrality a possibility in the event of 
war. The official Swedish neutrality doctrine slightly changed after the Cold War. 
Officially, in 1992, the definition was rephrased from "non-aligned in peacetime aiming 
at neutrality in wartime" to: "a non-aligned position which would make it possible to be 
neutral in case of war in the neighboring area". Through this modification, a certain 
element of vagueness (since neutrality no longer was an obvious choice) was introduced 
which eventually opened the way for greater "freedom of action".158 Today, the public 
opinion in Sweden as well as in Finland supports the development of civilian and 
military crisis management of the EU but is opposed to the idea of EU's common 
defense. Regarding NATO, the same attitude prevails: in both countries, NATO is 
regarded as a central pillar of European security, and a majority of the public opinion 
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supports participation in the collective security activities of NATO but is opposed to 
membership in NATO (collective defense). 159 
Denmark took an opt-out from the CFSP/CESDP provisions of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Denmark’s position is that it is not in favor of Europe even attempting to create 
an autonomous defense capacity, which it believes should remain the sole prerogative of 
NATO. Copenhagen believes that the EU should concentrate on civil approaches to 
peacekeeping and conflict resolution and is very opposed (as high as 66 per cent in some 
polls) to Europe creating its own-armed force, briefly no defense or defense policy 
within the EU institutional framework.160 On the other hand, in a security policy 
perspective, Denmark is getting more marginalized as a consequence of the further 
elaboration and implementation of the ESDP within the EU. As a consequence, 
Denmark has reduced its influence on the EU’s general development in security and 
defense.161 
Austria has a specific status regarding its security and defense policy due to their 
experience of neutrality. However it would be far too simplistic to draw a strong divide 
based on neutrality between Austria and the EU-NATO countries. Although it 
participates in the PfP, Austria remains neutral and has not expressed a desire to join 
NATO, in part, because no consensus yet exists among its political parties. The majority 
of the population remains in favor of maintaining a status of neutrality and is against 
NATO membership. However, a large part of the Austrian population is aware of the 
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contradictions related to the Austrian foreign and security policy. And a majority of 
Austrians support the idea that their country should participate in the crisis management 
activities of the EU but is opposed to a common European defense. Although Austria 
has no National Security Concept, its neutral national security policy stresses the goals 
of preventing conflict, of not becoming involved in any military conflicts if they occur, 
and in restoring territorial integrity if invaded.162  
Ireland held five referenda about European integration (1972, 1986, 1992, 1998, 
and 2001) where the government reaffirmed its commitment towards neutrality. In June 
2001, the refusal in a referendum by a majority of the Irish people to authorize the 
ratification of the Nice is partly due to anxieties about the future of Irish neutrality.  
In summary, each country adopted a position on each separate problem 
according to their national interests, institutional essentials, and the cultural values and 
norms appropriate to its historical and social traditions.  
2.3. Concluding Remarks: 
The ESDP is an evolving process. At the beginning years of the post-Cold War, 
the uncertainties of the new security environment, institutional worries, diversities of 
national priorities, and the lack of a united political will of member states are the main 
reasons creating discussions about the ESDP process. The latest developments, however, 
have clearly revealed EU members’ political will to construct an autonomous ESDP. 
The most significant result of the process starting with St. Malo is that today the EU has 
a much more “autonomous” security prospect in comparison with the ESDI in 1994. The 
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efforts, which were first started within NATO to create “separable but not separate” 
European forces, have been accelerated in the last four years and shifted toward creating 
an “autonomous” ESDP within the framework of the EU.  
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the Soviet threat has mostly vanished, the last 
decade showed that Europe still does not have adequate means to deal with its security 
and defense problems. Kosovo air war made it clear that the US had better resources for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; more accurate precision–guided 
munitions; as well as superior air and sealift resources, logistics, and communications.163 
There is a strong need for further capabilities that would enable Europe to act on its own, 
but Europe still lacks the economic and technological power to realize this. Therefore, 
the continuation of a strong transatlantic link should still be considered.  
Among the key driving forces leading to the launch of the ESDP project are 
‘experiences in the Bosnia and Kosovo’, ‘desires of the United States’ on European 
capabilities for dealing with situations where the US prefers not to be involved or take 
the lead, and on the issue of sharing defense expenditure, and ‘change in the British 
position’ launched by Prime Minister Blair who made clear its intention to steer a more 
pro-European course on security policy. 
 
 
 
                                                 
163 Peter Van Ham, op.cit. p.5 
69 
The concept of a European-only defense has always been defined differently by 
various nations. Their expectations and goals were always different, yet the main themes 
of the dispute have remained constant. The prospects, aims, and intentions of the 
different players are still various and complex. For example, the UK’s and Germany’s 
perceptions of the ESDP are substantially different from the French perception. While 
the French view the ESDP as a way of decreasing the US influence in European affairs, 
the UK opposes the idea of creating a European defense system completely autonomous 
from the transatlantic alliance. On the other side, the US views the ESDP as a way of 
realizing the long desired fair ‘burden-sharing’ by leading Europeans to create further 
capabilities.  
However, the question is how ESDP will be realized without causing damage to 
the transatlantic alliance. Common thought is that an autonomous ESDP and military 
crisis management capability for situations where NATO as a whole chooses not to 
engage could benefit the Alliance and the transatlantic relationship. If it is accomplished 
properly, the ESDP could increase its power and could rectify many capability gaps of 
Europe. It could further help to rationalize a more balanced burden sharing, and could 
lead to a considerable strategic partnership between the EU and NATO. On the other 
hand, if it is completed unsatisfactorily, this new project could divide the transatlantic 
Alliance, could diminish the European capacity to manage crises, and could weaken 
Alliance cohesion and solidarity. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. NON-EU PERSPECTIVES ON ESDP 
The end of the Cold War produced dramatic changes in Europe's geopolitical 
order. Twelve ‘Newly Independent States’ (NIS) emerged as autonomous nations, and 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were freed from Soviet domination. 
Rapid economic and political changes and the overall military situation have 
transformed the European security into a different environment.164 New security threats 
and challenges have emerged over the past decade. As a result, the security 
arrangements and relations between EU-member and non-EU states have become very 
complicated.165 
In this chapter, the implications of current European security initiatives on the 
non-EU states will be evaluated. What the perspectives of main actors of world security 
structure, the US and Russia, on the ESDP are, and how ESDP affects those nations that 
are non-EU NATO members will be examined, from the point of both Euro-Atlantic and 
global security considerations.   
                                                 
164 Joseph A. Christoff, “European Security-US and European Contributions to Foster Stability and 
Security In Europe”, FDCH Government Account Reports, 28 November 2001. Avaiable [online] through 
EBSCOhost. 
165 There are mainly six groups of countries with whom the EU must deal according to its security 
considerations. First, members of NATO who will become members of the EU soon after the permanent 
ESDP institutions and headline force begin to operate: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Second, 
NATO members who have expressed no wish to join the EU or which have rejected membership: Iceland 
and Norway. Third, EU member countries who are not NATO members: Ireland, Sweden, Austria and 
Finland. Fourth, the group of seven countries, who are candidates for both NATO and EU membership, 
and may become members of both at different times and in differing order: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Fifth, Denmark, as a unique member of both EU and NATO, 
but in the security dimension only as an observer with limited rights and privileges. Finally, Turkey, an 
essential member of NATO by virtue of its strategic location, military power and sheer size, is waiting for 
EU membership. See Francois Heisbourg, “European Defense: Making It Work”, Chaillot Paper 42, 
(Paris: Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union), Sept. 2000, pp.51-52 
71 
3.1. The United States and ESDP: 
Europe and the US are regarded as the most closely integrated regions in the 
world. For example, in the economic sphere, the US and the EU are two of the largest 
trading partners. In 1990, the US exported goods worth $76 billion to the EU, while by 
the end of the century, this figure increased to $400 billion. It is estimated that if 
investments of Eastern European countries are added, then the economic relationship 
between the US and Europe would stand at almost $2 trillion a year.166 The European 
countries and the US cooperate in many areas, such as banking, insurance, automobiles, 
oil corporations, telecommunications, and so forth.  
The United States has always been a strong supporter of European integration 
efforts. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the European devastated economy 
made NATO’s European members highly dependent on the United States. In the late 
1940s and 1950s, the Marshall Plan conditioned aid on the recipient countries for 
rebuilding their devastated economies. The US aids aimed not only to create a 
prosperous and democratic European partner but also to help build a structure which 
would serve legitimate American security interests.167 In the 1960s, President John F. 
Kennedy expressed the twin pillar concept for the United States and European Economic 
Community. In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger called for the kind of cooperation that would 
lead to the emergence of a single European phone number. In 1994, President William J. 
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Clinton expressed support for a strong Europe.168 In 2001, the new Secretary of State, 
Colin Powell said during his Senate confirmation testimony "We welcome a more 
integrated, robust and a stronger Europe, an all the more capable partner in the 
challenging times ahead. And our European allies, as part of this change, are in the midst 
of important efforts to improve their defense capabilities. We will support any such 
effort as long as it strengthens NATO, and does not weaken NATO."169 
According to Quadrennial Defense Review Report-2001, prepared by the US 
Department of Defense, ‘the United States has interests, responsibilities, and 
commitments that span the world. As a global power with an open society, the United 
States is affected by trends, events, and influences that originate from beyond its 
borders.’170 As indicated in the US National Security Strategy-1999, prepared by the 
White House, “… Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership 
abroad. The United States must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home. We cannot 
lead abroad unless we devote the necessary resources to military, diplomatic, 
intelligence and other efforts.”171 Therefore, the United States has significant interests 
and responsibilities around the globe. Mutually, this leads to high demands on US armed 
forces which have outstanding capabilities such as satellites, intelligence, command-
control-communications systems, and significant abilities such as power projection and 
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logistics support, in Europe and beyond.172 For instance, in NATO, primary vehicle for 
projecting US power in Europe, the presence of 300,000 armed forces personnel was the 
visible sign of the US interests and commitment to European security during the Cold 
War.173 
Since the Cold War, US policymakers have debated the nature and extent of the 
contributions of the US to security and stability in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, 
this debate was centered on whether Europeans were spending enough on military forces 
and capabilities. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the 
emergence of many instabilities and threats, for example ethnic conflicts in the Balkans. 
The limited character of NATO European contributions to combat operations and 
alliance’s ineffective decision-making process during the air operations in the Kosovo 
conflict increased US dissatisfaction.174 In this new environment, new questions have 
arisen about the military and nonmilitary contributions the US are making to security in 
the European region.175  
In this respect, the US has clearly supported for an autonomous EU security 
entity conditioned on Europeans strengthening their forces in line with the NATO 
Defense Capabilities Initiative, agreed upon at the Washington summit, which calls for 
the upgrade of allied forces with an emphasis on deployability, viability, and 
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sustainability.176 Ever since NATO’s Brussels summit of 1994, the United States has, at 
least rhetorically, supported the development of a European Security and Defense 
Identity and expressed its readiness to make Alliance assets and capabilities available for 
EU operations. However, Washington was troubled with the EU’s Cologne summit, 
where the Europeans proposed to give the EU an autonomous defense character.  But, 
the subsequent Helsinki summit was reassuring to the United States, because it 
established the CESDP within the Atlantic security framework and with concrete 
military headline goals.177 
The US policy towards the ESDI/ESDP can be characterized as a “Yes, but” 
policy. On the one hand, there is a desire to encourage a greater defense effort from 
European NATO members. However, the US does not want an ESDP that create splits 
in the Transatlantic Alliance.178 The intent of ESDI was to strengthen the European 
pillar of the NATO and to give a greater European autonomy and responsibility for its 
own common security and defense matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic 
link.179  
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3.1.1. The United States’ potential benefits from the ESDP 
Indeed, Europe’s inability to deal with several contingencies after the Cold War 
resulted in the US administrations giving weight to the formation of the ESDP with the 
following hopes. 
First, since the end of the Cold War and the dramatic decline in the offensive 
capabilities of Russian forces, US defense planning has reduced the resources for 
defending its European allies against a major assault. The current threats (small-scale 
conflicts, peace keeping missions) on the continent could be handled very well by the 
EU members with the assistance of a few or no US forces. Although Europe might not 
have the capability to assume the full range of the “Petersberg tasks” for several years in 
the future, a serious European effort to develop and fund new capabilities could 
eventually benefit the United States by reducing the resources required for the most 
likely European contingencies.180 The United States might also benefit, for the reason 
that these developments produce additional capabilities for responses to conflicts beyond 
Europe. Many European countries have been reluctant to support military operation 
beyond Europe. To handle the security problems in the problematic regions such as the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East have been generally viewed as the United States’ 
duty. Similarly, European countries for the most part have been unaware of new threats 
to security including those deriving from spread of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), terrorism, and ethnic, racial, and religious conflicts. A broader European 
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perspective on security requirements and better force projection would make Europeans 
more valuable to the United States in operations beyond Europe.181 
Furthermore, the greater European self-reliance and responsibility might reduce 
European antipathy of current US dominance in security matters, and this could 
eventually remove the barriers to French full reintegration into NATO’s integrated 
military command structure. Moreover, the developments in the ESDP within the 
framework of the EU could force European neutral states, namely Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden, to recognize their responsibility for security and force them to 
make contributions to the European security. These neutral states could eventually 
become NATO members and strengthen NATO both politically and militarily.182    
For most EU members, the driving force for ESDP is not the need for an 
independent defense capability per se as to be able to act when and if the United States 
decides for its own reasons not to act. But in any serious military operation, Europeans 
will want the US to participate. This causes the continuation of American engagement in 
Europe appropriate to the US interests.183  
The US might also be of advantage to a developing ESDP since the US has to 
maintain an adequate military presence in Europe because of the fact that building an 
effective ESDP needs time to create the necessary capabilities and to transform military 
organizations. Therefore, the United States has to sustain its presence over this period of 
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transition. The United States also can use ESDP as a means of improving modernization 
and interoperability with its Europeans allies and partners. This could help avoid 
unnecessary and debilitating intra-Alliance debates over standardization, rationalization, 
and interoperability. Used properly, ESDP could lead to joint research and development 
efforts that could save the United States and Europe time and resources.184  
3.1.2. US concerns about the ESDP 
The European countries and the US differ over many issues. For example, in the 
very beginning of the post-Cold War era, the US and its European partners differed on 
how to handle and manage the Balkan Wars. Initially, under the influence of pan-
European solidarity, European countries pointed out that a solution to the problem could 
be found within Europe. They did not see many roles for the US. But, later, they realized 
their limitations and looked towards the United States.185 There have been always some 
concerns and contradictions in both sides. The major US concern about ESDP is how 
this new initiative will affect transatlantic relations and the function of NATO. EU 
efforts that divert too much attention from the common work of NATO would diminish 
support for US engagement in Europe and make military cooperation more difficult.186  
There are some concerns about the feasibility of ESDP. Does it strengthen 
overall security in Europe? At Helsinki, the EU decided to create a 60,000-man rapid-
reaction force, by the year 2003, that can be sustained up to a year. In reality, this means 
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a force of approximately 200,000 troops because of rotation. In an era of declining 
defense budgets in Europe, there are some uncertainties about whether the Europeans 
can provide the money needed to pay for the manpower, and logistics support needed to 
maintain such a force. Additionally, ESDP will deal with the low end of the military 
spectrum, the Petersburg tasks such as peacekeeping, humanitarian rescue, etc. But 
many of the crises in Europe, for example Kosovo, required more than peacekeeping.187 
One American concern is that this would provide a backdoor security guarantee 
to EU members who are not covered by NATO’s Article 5. Because non-NATO EU 
member states, like Finland and Austria, will participate fully in the ESDP, and they will 
indirectly affect the European contribution to NATO. Therefore, in crisis situations, they 
may call upon the United States for military assistance. What the impact of the new 
strategic balance within the Alliance on Europe’s defense industrial base is another US 
question that remains unresolved.188 
The United States’ concerns about ESDP could be summarized in a phrase 
known as “three D’s”: duplication, decoupling, and discrimination as mentioned 
earlier.189 
First, regarding “duplication”, does it strengthen NATO’s ability to deal more 
effectively with crises in Europe and beyond its borders or does it lead to a duplication 
of capabilities? The ESDP could produce rhetoric, promises and institutions that would 
duplicate NATO systems, but provide no additional capabilities. The United States 
supports the EU’s desire to enhance its defense capabilities, but does not support new 
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institutions that could complicate the decision-making process and confuse the 
coordination between the EU and NATO.190 The developments in the institutions but not 
in the capabilities justify US criticisms about duplicating of NATO systems. 
Additionally, the European decision to create “autonomous” military capabilities 
suggests that Europeans would create capabilities that are already available, the same as 
NATO or US assets, rather than creating additional capabilities for NATO.191 One of the 
most recent important speeches on US views towards the ESDP was given by William 
Cohen, at the informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Birmingham on 10 
October 2000. On duplication, he argued that it would be highly ineffective, seriously 
wasteful of resources, and contradictory to the basic principles of close NATO-EU 
cooperation if NATO and the EU were based on autonomous force planning 
structures.192 
Second, regarding “decoupling”, does it help build a stronger and healthier 
transatlantic relationship? At Helsinki, it was decided that the EU would act only “when 
NATO as a whole is not involved.” But there needs to be adequate transparency in 
decision-making. Without clear links, however, there is a danger that the two institutions 
will get slowed down in bureaucratic disputes over jurisdiction while a crisis escalates 
out of control.193 The ESDP could become a beginning point for a destructive EU-US 
rivalry thus ending the transatlantic alliance. There are suspicions in Washington that the 
ESDP would become a neo-Gaullist means for Europe to distinguish its foreign policies 
                                                 
190 Alexander Vershbow, US Ambassador to NATO, “European Defense and NATO: A Vision of the 
Future NATO-EU Relationship” speech in Centre d'Etudes Europeennes de Waterloo, Waterloo, Belgium, 
October 19, 2000. 
191 Stanley R. Sloan, Chaillot Paper 39, op.cit., p.43 
192 "Common European Security and Defense Policy: A Progress Report”, UK Parliament Library 
Research Paper 00/84, 31 October 2000, Available [Online] < http://www.parliament.uk > 
193 F. Stephen Larrabee, RAND testimony series: CT-168, op.cit. p.4 
80 
from that of the US. France’s anti-Americanism is a well-known fact and the US is 
concerned that France’s attitude toward “US hegemony” will become the entire EU 
attitude.194  
Third, in regards to “discrimination”, the ESDP could create artificial divisions 
and distinctions among NATO allies, undermining NATO’s political cohesion. There is 
a need to ensure that ESDP develops in a way that does not discriminate against non-EU 
NATO members, such as Turkey, Norway, Iceland and NATO’s new Central European 
members. NATO has proved to be efficient as an institution. Its members have already 
shown the required political and military will to make it work. However, the ESDP’s 
exclusive nature has already caused some problems among NATO members.195 The 
dynamics of the new arrangements within the framework of the ESDP may deepen 
differences among the members again undermining NATO’s political cohesion. The 
differences between the security needs and threat perceptions of EU and non-EU 
members of NATO could eventually undermine the overall effectiveness of NATO.196  
Briefly, Washington does not want: a decoupling of Europe’s security from that 
of America’s; a duplication of effort and capabilities; or discrimination against those 
allies outside the EU. Although Lord Robertson formulated a looser, and less negative, 
“three I”s (the indivisibility of the transatlantic link; the improvement of European 
capabilities; and the inclusiveness of all allies in Europe’s defense policy), explaining 
the difficult facts of the ESDP is inevitably a source of strain in US–EU relations.197 
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Despite suspicions that the ESDP could be the beginning of a strategic rivalry 
between the United States and Europe, many US officials found these suspicions 
exaggerated. According to a former Clinton administration official, Ivo Daalder, who 
served on the Clinton Administration’s National Security Council staff, “Washington’s 
suspicions [about ESDP motivations] are not only exaggerated; they are fundamentally 
misplaced. Europe’s problem today, as Kosovo underscored, is not its potential future 
strength. On the contrary, the real problem is Europe’s actual political and military 
weakness.”198 
Some scholars like Zbigniew Brzezinski warn that the concerns about the ESDP 
should not prevent the United States from supporting European unification.199 Professor 
Simon Serfaty presented a similar theme in his statement to the House Committee on 
International Relations. According to him “entering a new century, our main fear about 
Europe should be that of a Europe that is weak and divided, and our main hope should 
be for a Europe that does become stronger and more united.”200 
At the final analysis, one could say, the United States, despite its reasonable 
concerns, supports the ESDP because it could enhance European security commitments, 
provide additional capabilities, and enable European countries to handle their own 
small-scale security problems without undermining the transatlantic alliance and NATO. 
Thus, provided that it has institutional links with the alliance, the United States is not 
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against the ESDP or against an “autonomous” European security structure unless it 
undermines the transatlantic alliance. 
Nevertheless, an important point should not be overlooked. The ESDP, even in 
its most harmless form, will be a potential threat to NATO’s coherence since the ESDP 
will make a distinction between “collective defense” and “collective security” missions 
of the Alliance. This in turn will create some division among the members. Everybody 
agrees that collective defense, although not of primary importance in the present 
strategic situation, is still one of the alliance’s fundamental security tasks. By contrast, 
as the April 1999 Washington summit made clear, regional crisis management by NATO 
occur only on a case-by-case basis. For the EU, on the other hand, crisis management in 
Europe will be a permanent function. The United States has no concern about such an 
arrangement since it will provide the United States with the flexibility in its course of 
action and will relieve it from the burdens of European security commitments. However 
any division of labor between NATO and the EU that would relegate the alliance to 
collective defense only, while leaving crisis management to the EU, would marginalize 
its non-EU European members.201 As shown in the next chapters this particularly applies 
to Turkey.   
3.2. Russia in European security: 
The Russian Federation, a huge landmass extending from Finland to China, has 
still a significant role to play in Europe. It has important political influence all over the 
world as a nuclear state and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Its 
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special geopolitical position202, special arrangements with the institutions of European 
Security, and its military presence in several regions could easily affect the emerging 
ESDP.203  
The relationship between Russia and Western Europe is an important element of 
the post-Cold War European security architecture. The question of the development of a 
new security regime to replace the old bloc divide between NATO and Warsaw Pact has 
been the most debatable issue affecting this relationship in the post-Cold War era.204 
During the Cold War, the USSR was quite cautious about West European security 
cooperation. It was widely assumed that the USSR actively encouraged West European 
military cooperation in an effort to weaken the transatlantic link and to “decouple” the 
United States from its European allies. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall this has 
all changed, and Russia now has a heightened interest in the EU and the European 
integration process.205 
Since the early 1990s, Russian thinking about ESDP has become more positive. 
Today, EU is Russia's main trading partner, its main investor and also its largest donor 
of assistance and grants under the ‘Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
202 From the economical perspective of EU, Russia has the most important place since instability in 
Caucasus and rivalry on the Caspian Basin affect the safety of energy routes to Europe. 
203 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Russia Adrift”, Harvard International Review, vol. 22, issue 1, Winter / Spring 
2000, p.6 
204 Paul Flenley, “Russia in the New Europe”, in Fergus Carr (ed.), Europe: the Cold Divide, (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p.107 
205 For a few historical notes, see John Roper and Peter van Ham, “Russia and the West,” in Vladimir 
Baranovski, ed., Russia in Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, London/Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997 
84 
Independent States’ (TACIS)206 program.207 Western policy has aimed to integrate 
Russia into the global system economically and politically through measures such as 
inviting Russia to attend G7 meetings, incorporating Russia into the Council of Europe, 
extending both the Partnership for Peace programme and the special NATO-Russia 
strategic relationship, and supporting the International Monetary Fund (IMF) plan to 
reform the Russian economy.208   
Most Russian official statements and publications on West European defense and 
politico–military cooperation are set in a positive tone, quite unlike the Russian debate 
over NATO and its enlargement process. Even though ESDP offers a mutual military 
commitment, it was never perceived as a primary instrument of western policy toward 
communism. It is indeed significant that, the intensive development of EU’s military 
dimension and its process of enlargement have not provoked a negative reaction in 
Russia.209  
When WEU decided in 1994 to offer Central European countries (including the 
three Baltic States) the status of Associate Partner, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev stated that Russia had no objections to this move. European initiatives to 
strengthen the political independence and military capabilities have generally met with 
explicit Russian support. For example, when the NAC endorsed, at the Berlin ministerial 
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meeting in 1996, the concept of WEU using NATO assets for EU–led operations, 
Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev officially welcomed “the increased role of 
WEU in solving West European problems,” and noted that the “increased independence 
of WEU from NATO” should be considered a “very positive fact.”210 
One point for the significance of Russia to European Security is about its 
potential to affect the enlargement processes of both EU and NATO. Moscow obtained 
an assurance in May 1997, NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. The Founding 
Act acknowledged that NATO and Russia were no longer adversaries and marked the 
beginning of a new era in relations. According to Founding Act, the alliance would carry 
out its missions by ‘ensuring’ the necessary interoperability, integration and capability 
for reinforcements other than political commitments.211 
The EU adopted its Common Strategy on Russia at the Cologne summit of June 
1999. The Common Strategy has done much to consolidate and stimulate a more general 
and comprehensive EU approach toward Russia. Russia and WEU, however, participate 
in a number of practical cooperative projects. In November 1995, for example, a 
commercial contract was signed between the WEU Satellite Center in Torrejón, Spain, 
and the Russian state armaments company ‘Rosvoorouzhenie’.212 
For Russia, establishing a closer relationship with Western Europe is an 
important element in stimulating multi-polarity in world politics. Furthermore, 
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structurally ESDP is not seen as presenting a security threat to Russia, and Europe's 
flexible institutional structure offers Russia an alternative to join in.  
In its relations with the EU, Russia has from the very beginning supported 
dialogue on international policy and security as well as practical cooperation in these 
fields. This strategy was emphasized by the new Russian leadership, which expressed 
the intention to enhance the EU-Russian security partnership, including its military, 
political and technical aspects. The Joint Statement of the Russia-EU Summit verified 
this intention in May 2000. President V.V. Putin expressed the positive interest towards 
forming EU security and defense policy and noted in this respect the existing 
possibilities for cooperation.213 
In Rome, on 28 May 2002, Heads of State and Government from NATO member 
countries and the Russian Federation launched a new era in NATO-Russia cooperation. 
They signed the Rome Declaration, "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality", that has 
formally established the NATO-Russia Council. The creation of the NATO-Russia 
Council was prompted by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US and the 
consequent need for greater cooperation between NATO and Russia in dealing with 
challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It 
replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, established by the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act in 1997. The NATO-Russia Council is therefore designed to bring 
relations to a higher level by providing "a mechanism for consultation, consensus-
building, cooperation, joint decision, and joint action for the member states of NATO 
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and Russia on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region". The 
security issues of common interest that have been defined are:  
• the struggle against terrorism;  
• crisis management;  
• non-proliferation;  
• arms control and confidence-building measures;  
• theatre missile defense;  
• search and rescue at sea;  
• military-to-military cooperation and defense reform;  
• civil emergencies;  
• new threats and challenges. 214 
Obviously, Russia's security relationship with the European Union will cover the 
areas in which the Union will be capable. These are mainly soft security issues, which 
are most relevant for contemporary Europe. At one end of the spectrum, one will deal 
with environmental and NBC security (including nuclear waste disposal, chemical 
disarmament, etc.), at the other, the Petersberg tasks.215 
There are a number of reasons why Russia seems to be comfortable with the 
EU’s defense plans. First, West European military–political cooperation and integration 
do not pose a direct threat to Russian security. Russia is interested in increasing the EU's 
political weight, which is consistent with Russia's concept of a multi-polar world. 
Second, the EU’s focus on Petersberg missions seems to create a benign psychological 
climate in Russia which makes cooperation with the EU easier and politically less 
sensitive. Third, Europe’s efforts to set up an ESDP clearly point in the direction of a 
strengthening and rapprochement of Western Europe’s security institutions. The 
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increasing EU autonomy in foreign and security policy in combination with the 
development of partnership with Russia is perceived positively within Russia, mainly 
because they strengthen Western Europe’s position within NATO, which may give 
Russia more political incentives and possibilities for cooperation with the Alliance. 
ESDP would promote a decrease in the US-centrism of security arrangements in the 
Europe.  Furthermore, it would bring new opportunities for Russia to reach its security 
aims and to strengthen its own voice in Europe.216  
3.3. Non-EU European NATO Members and ESDP:  
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey, all are 
members of NATO but not the EU. These states share the American concern that EU 
decisions and operations could effectively discriminate against them and weaken 
transatlantic links with the US. They concerned that the EU security force will have a 
negative impact on the long-term commitment of the US to European security.217 They 
are worried that even though the EU could theoretically employ NATO assets, they 
would have no influence on any decisions or actions taken by the EU. The non-EU 
NATO states have consequently demanded the right to fully participate in the 
development of the new EU Rapid Reaction Force and to sit on the EU’s political and 
military committees.”218 
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3.3.1. Norway: 
Norway is a country which always has underlined the necessity of strong Atlantic 
co-operation in European security and defense affairs. European only arrangements have 
always been met with suspicion in Norway. But, Norway did not give any negative 
response to the enhanced European efforts in security and defense in the aftermath of the 
St-Malo summit in December 1998. On the contrary, it has given strong backing. 
Norway has supported the EU’s efforts to strengthen its role in security and defense 
through the development of European crisis management capabilities in close co-
ordination with NATO.219  
The changes in the geopolitical environment surrounding Norway, where the EU 
together with Russia and the US determine the framework for Norwegian security, 
affected the Norwegian turn about ESDP. Another reason behind this support could be 
the fact that the US and Britain, the leading Atlantic powers, apparently supported the 
ESDP and the development of an autonomous military capacity in the case that NATO 
does not wish to take part in.  
Therefore, in 1999 the Norwegian government stated that it was ready to enhance 
its contribution to international crisis management within EU and NATO framework. In 
that respect Norway also officially declared that Norway’s security is interconnected 
with the security of the member states of the EU and that of the Union itself. But, on the 
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other hand, the main Norwegian concern, like Turkey, has been about the ability to take 
part in the decision-making process as a non-EU member.220 
Regarding to the issue of participation in decision-making process, the 
Norwegian view of the Feira European Council was that the six non-EU European 
NATO members should be able to take part in the day-to-day consultations and 
activities. Instead, the Feira European Council decided to establish a single, inclusive 
structure in which all fifteen countries (the six non-EU European NATO members plus 
nine candidates for accession to the EU) can involve in the necessary dialogue, and hold 
ad hoc consultations with the EU. 221  
Nevertheless, Norway still seems to look upon NATO as the most important 
European security institution. Norwegian support for the ESDP is conditioned to the 
expectation that the emerging security and defense dimension of the EU shall reinforce 
the transatlantic link.222 
3.3.2. Hungary: 
Despite the fact that NATO membership deepens Hungary’s commitment to a 
new security model based on cooperation, membership changes Hungary’s geopolitical 
position from having been a western part of the East, to becoming an eastern part of the 
West.223 
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As declared in the parliament resolution no. 94/1998, on the Principles of the 
Hungarian Republic’s Security and Defense Policy, Hungary recognizes the principles 
of Alliance’s common security and defense policy. While the main duty of the 
Hungarian armed forces is to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the country and to 
participate in the common defense of the Alliance, they shall participate in further joint 
missions, take part in international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions under the 
auspices of other international organizations and fight grave industrial, civilizational or 
natural catastrophes.224  
Hungary has been supporting the EU’s efforts to build up its role in security and 
defense as much as crisis management capabilities while giving great importance to the 
transatlantic link. As an indication of its honest support to ESDP, Hungary declared to 
provide military assets and personnel for the EU rapid reaction force, and pledged to the 
EU a mechanized infantry battalion of 350 soldiers and a platoon-sized air-defense unit. 
3.3.3. Iceland: 
Iceland has never maintained its own military forces and its policy has been to 
maintain strong defense cooperation with the United States. Iceland became a founding 
member of NATO in 1949, and in 1951 concluded a bilateral defense agreement with 
the United States. Iceland has also strong link to the European affairs. Iceland, along 
with Norway and Liechtenstein, has negotiated a free trade agreement with the EU; has 
been party to EU programs on education, science, and culture; and signed the Schengen 
agreement on open borders for travelers within Europe. But application for EU 
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membership is not on Iceland’s agenda, and no Icelandic political party has EU 
membership in its manifesto. On the security and defense matters, Iceland’s interests 
involve primarily the maintenance of the transatlantic link, and do not wish to become 
isolated when ESDP is implemented, although giving support to the development of the 
ESDP.225 
3.3.4. Czech Republic: 
The Czech Republic supports the development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), which is perceived as an inevitable accomplishment of the 
process of the European integration. The Czech Republic fully supports EU's efforts to 
reinforce its crisis management capabilities and to act effectively where NATO as a 
whole is not engaged. The Czech Republic strongly believes that through development 
of ESDP, the EU will strengthen NATO as the main pillar of European security. At the 
Capability Commitment Conference the Czech Republic clearly declared its willingness 
to contribute to the fulfillment of the European Headline Goal by providing its national 
contribution of forces and assets. Thus, the Czech Republic has made a practical step to 
join the EU in its efforts to strengthen European military capabilities.226 
3.3.5. Poland: 
According to Poland foreign policy, NATO must remain the central element of 
European security and maintain the proper, complementary balance between its 
European and Euro-Atlantic dimensions. For that reason, Poland forcefully advocates 
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both a permanent American presence in Europe and the development of cooperation 
among NATO's European members within the framework of the European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI).227 Poland supports the development of the European defense 
identity and considers it a necessary step to enable Europe to play a more decisive and 
responsible role in shaping international order. However, Poland believes that such a 
development can and should take place within the NATO framework. This strong belief 
derives from a conviction that there are vital common transatlantic security interests, as 
well as shared basic values, that unite the two sides of Atlantic.228  
3.4. Concluding Remarks: 
For the last several years, there has been intense debate across the Atlantic about 
the relationship between NATO and the EU, in regard to ESDP. Several issues have 
been discussing among both politicians and academics, such as how ESDP should 
function efficiently; what tasks it should carry out and leave to NATO; for the Headline 
Goal Task Force what the proper role is; and what the level of European defense 
spending and the equipment should be in order not to “duplicate” NATO.   
The United States has welcomed the development of a Headline Goal Task Force 
that focuses on development of military capabilities that can also contribute to NATO. 
The United States has been pleased about the development of an ESDP and a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy that can lead Europe to play a more active role beyond the 
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European continent. The United States also has welcomed a European capability for 
crisis management, especially civilian aspects.229 
Even though the United States has always welcomed a stronger ‘European pillar’ 
in the transatlantic Alliance, it has been wary of attitudes that would divide the Alliance 
politically, take resources away from NATO military cooperation, and not give way 
additional military capabilities to produce more equitable burden-sharing. The US 
approach could be termed a ‘yes, but’ policy, supporting the European effort but 
warning of its potential negative consequences.230 Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright’s famous “three D”s illustrate these concerns. Washington does not want a 
decoupling of Europe’s security from that of America’s; a duplication of effort and 
capabilities; or discrimination against those allies outside the EU.  
Europe’s new defense ambitions have not only been concerned about NATO’s 
role and the future of the transatlantic relationship, but also have a serious impact on the 
strategic environment of all Central and East European countries, including Russia. The 
general trend in Moscow’s governmental circles is to welcome the EU’s military plans 
as a step to eliminate American hegemony in Europe and NATO–centrism. From this 
perspective, ESDP is seen as a means to block the creation of a unipolar world led by the 
United States.231 
The ESDP can be accepted as a major step toward full European integration, in 
comparable with progress toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Additionally, 
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the European Union’s security and defense policy has to be inclusive, with the full 
participation of the non-EU European allies in political and military work.  
The non-EU NATO members have very similar interests in the ESDP process. 
None of them wants its NATO commitment undermined or weakened in any manner. 
Each country accepts the leading role of the United States in current international 
security and each regards the US as the pivotal actor. Consequently, none of them wants 
to do anything that could be interpreted by the US as weakening the transatlantic link. 
Each of them wants to use this process as a vehicle to advance its interaction in the EU. 
Each country wants to establish inclusive and transparent consultation arrangements as 
well as involvement in planning and decision shaping. Each country wants a multilateral 
mechanism through which their views could be expressed more clearly. Each of them 
wants to base co-operation in this framework on both political and military/operational 
pillars.232  
There are important dissimilarities as well. Some of the countries made certain 
offers, before the Feira EU Council meeting, to contribute to the improvement of 
European capabilities, one (Hungary) did not. In sum, these countries, although with 
somewhat different levels of commitment, have all attributed great importance to the 
transatlantic link. Some of them have threat perceptions based on history or the current 
environment. Consequently, they do not want to see their interest jeopardized through a 
de-coupling between the US and its European partners.233 
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As a non-EU European NATO member, Turkey has different concerns about the 
ESDP. It is against any form of “autonomous” ESDP that excludes Turkey. Turkey 
rightfully has its own concerns about the implications of the ESDP. To elaborate those 
concerns and implications, the following chapter will examine Turkey’s place in the 
European security system and its position regarding the ESDP. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.   TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM 
Turkey has a unique place in Europe and maintains a different position in many 
respects: geographically, culturally, economically and militarily. Turkey’s geographical 
significance inherently imposes on it the role of a "bridge" or a "bulwark". Turkey’s 
security environment is characterized by a certain multi-regional aspect. Turkey isn’t 
only a European or a Middle Eastern country, but also a Balkan, a Black Sea, a 
Mediterranean and a Eurasian state. It is a Western oriented Muslim country surrounded 
by different regimes with different perceptions, culture and competing national 
aspirations.234  
This chapter focuses specifically on Turkey’s involvement in evolving EU 
security structures. In the first section of this chapter, a concise historical background on 
the evolution of Turkey as an actor on the world scene, and Turkey’s position and 
contributions to European security in the post-Cold War   will be discussed. Then, 
Turkish policy toward the ESDP will be given by examining the subject in details with 
reference to both its concerns about the ESDP and its possible contributions to it. 
Finally, Turkey’s relations with the United States that has always-major impact on 
Turkey’s relations with Europe will be explored. 
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4.1. From the “Other” of Europe to “Ally” 
Turkey’s relations with Europe and its place within the European security system 
have gone through three stages. The first stage was before the modern state of Turkey 
emerged from the Ottoman Empire and began its role in the international system. 235 
Turks have been a part of Europe geographically since their arrival in Asia Minor in the 
eleventh century236 and economically since the fourteenth century with the first Ottoman 
grant of trade privileges to the Genoese in 1352, which also granted trade subsequently 
to Venice and Florence, and later to France in 1569, to England in 1580 and to the 
Netherlands in 1612.237 The recognition of Turks as a political part of Europe came 
about only in the nineteenth century, at the Paris Conference of 1856, when the Ottoman 
Empire was officially included in the Concert of Europe.238 Until that time the 
identification of the Ottoman Empire and the notion of Turk were defined in terms of 
“other” which indicated, in one respect, a notion of “adversary”.239  
The second stage of Turkey’s identification vis-à-vis Europe came with the 
creation of the modern Turkish state in 1923 with a pledge to pursue an idea of 
modernization and Westernization. The beginning of the Cold War led to the creation of 
a “Western security community” centering on NATO. According to Bradley Klein, it 
constituted a “project” to create a “Western system” through a variety of institutions 
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which ranged from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to the NATO. However, as Klein maintains, the 
crucial point of this system was the transatlantic relationship embodied in NATO for the 
raison d’être of this system was preserving one “way of life” against another. In this 
sense, Turkey was no longer the “other” in terms of Western identification, but a part of 
this Western ideal as well as the security architecture that was established to preserve 
this ideal. Turkey’s involvement with Western institutions, essentially, started in this 
period.240 
Turkey's cultural environment has influenced its search for security through 
alliances, its cautious foreign policy and the persistent efforts to embrace the West since 
the foundation of republic.241 During the Cold War, Turkey had a definite role to play. 
Turkey’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense effort was to contain NATO’s 
southern flank against the Soviet threat. In doing so, Turkey also blocked the access of 
Soviets to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, therefore, contributed to the 
implementation of the ‘containment’ strategy.242 Turkish forces tied down some twenty-
four Soviet divisions, which otherwise could have been concentrated against the central 
front.243 However, NATO’s culture of “central frontism” prevented the allies from 
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giving the credit to Turkey with the role it played in “locking up” Soviets.244  To 
understand the importance of Turkey’s role in the Cold War properly, one should answer 
that “what would have been the consequences had Turkey not been a member of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, but instead a member of the Warsaw Pact.”245  
During this period, Turkey’s security interests remained completely linked to 
Europe. The necessities of the Cold War  security environment easily tie in with 
Turkey’s Westernization and modernization project, which initiated by Atatürk. This 
caused Turkey to become a partner of the European security system increasingly. Aside 
from NATO, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, the CSCE, and an 
associate member of the WEU; thus, it subscribed to the same set of values as the Euro-
Atlantic community. Besides, the Turkish economy was essentially tied to Europe. 
Therefore, during that time, the peace and security in Europe became of vital importance 
to Turkey as the nation became a more integrated part of Europe.246  
The third stage of Turkey’s role and identity vis-à-vis Europe started with the 
end of the Cold War when the ‘Western security community’ began searching for a new 
role in the new security environment. A ‘collective defense to a common threat’ was 
replaced with the ‘promotion of central Western values’ that is, first of all democracy 
and free market economics with a more emphasis on human rights. The security 
community used the institutions inherited from the Cold War as a vehicle to achieve this 
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purpose, particularly to spread these values to the post-communist world.247 The shift of 
emphasis from collective defense to collective security seemed to decrease the strategic 
importance of Turkey in the Europeans’ eyes.248 In addition to that, the promotion of 
these values, the discussions of NATO, the WEU, and the EU enlargements brought the 
issue of ‘redefinition of Europe’ to the front position, and Turkey’s place in Europe 
came under scrutiny. Although the Turkey’s strategic importance for Western interests 
in the Middle East gave a new momentum to Turkey’s relations with the US, it failed to 
produce a similar effect in Turkey’s relations with Europe.249 But potentially, Turkey 
has a very important role to play in the long term against threats about which no one has 
a clear idea now.250  
Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War substantially reduced the strategic 
importance of Turkey in the European security system in terms of collective defense, the 
new post-Cold War security challenges to European security still make Turkey a 
valuable strategic partner for Europe. European security is being defined in broader 
terms. In the new European security environment, the most prominent risks are on 
Europe’s southern periphery and most of these contingencies are likely to happen on 
Turkey’s borders, or nearby. Thus, in the newly emerging security environment, post-
Cold War  security challenges, such as ethnic problems, energy security, countering the 
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threat of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, terrorism, ‘congaging’251 Russia, 
drug trafficking, illegal immigration are some areas requiring cooperation between 
Europeans and Turks.252  
Regarding such problems, Turkey is very well located. Turkey’s geographic 
location can be considered an enviable strategic military asset. It offers Turkey the 
option for acting either as a bridge or as a barrier over critical routes of transportation, 
both maritime and land (the Straits, and both the east-west and north-south). It provides 
an easy and short access to strategic natural resources, such as Caspian and Central 
Asian gas and oil. It can also be an ideal power base for force projection in a universal 
way. In a word, Turkey could potentially influence the Balkans, the Black Sea and the 
Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.253 
From a universal perspective, Turkey plays the role of a shield, a peripheral actor 
in all of the security regions surrounding it, namely the Balkans, the Middle East and the 
Caucasus. Its main function, in practice, is to separate other regional security concerns 
from each other.254 By doing so, Turkey plays a highly important role in securing the 
periphery of Europe. It stabilizes its region and prevents the problems of those three hot 
spots from being complicated by spilling over into one another. Other than the above 
factors, as stated by a former Senior Advisor to the President of Turkey, Turkey also acts 
as a model for the newly independent countries in the region and helps them to protect 
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their independence and entrance into the international community, serves as a catalyst 
for the progressive expansion of Western values deeper eastward and with its secular 
regime, it offers a dynamic alternative to fundamentalism.255 
Finally, Turkey’s high level of integration to Europe makes it an important part 
of Europe without which European security is unthinkable. There are close economic, 
social, and political bonds between Turkey and Europe, which integrates Turkey so 
strongly to Europe. The customs union with the EU in 1996 made Turkey “the 
nonmember country institutionally most strongly integrated with the EU.”256 Most 
Turkish firms abroad are in the European Union countries and three million Turks live, 
nearly five percent of Turkey’s population, forming the greatest number of Turks living 
outside Turkey.257 This number is roughly equal the populations of some small Eastern 
European states waiting for EU membership. In one respect, the migrant Turkish 
population in EU countries can be seen as “an extension of Turkey in Western 
Europe.”258 With its NATO membership, and Association Agreement with the EU and 
WEU, Turkey has close political and military bonds with Europe. Furthermore, Turkey 
is also a member of the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other European institutions ranging from trade 
unions to political party organizations.259  
                                                 
255 Nezihi Çakar, General (rtd.) served as Senior Advisor to the President of Turkey, “A Strategic 
Overview of Turkey,” Perceptions, Volume III-Number 2, June-August 1998  
256 Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, D.C.,2000, p.190. 
257 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Homepage, “Turks Living Abroad”, Available [Online] at  
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/acb/default1.htm> Accessed on 18 January 2001.  
258 Heinz Kramer, op.cit., p. 182. 
259 For detailed information on economic, social, and political bonds between Turkey and Europe see 
Heinz Kramer, Cp. 11 “Europe: Still the ‘Desired Land?’” in A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to 
Europe and the United States, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 181-202. 
104 
However, despite the fact that their security is so entangled, the developments in 
the European security architecture after the Cold War have seemingly underestimated 
Turkey’s place in the European security system.   
4.2. Turkey’s Contributions to European Security in the post-
Cold War  
The end of the Cold War (1989-91) marked the end of the greatest threat to 
European security, but it also brought a number of security challenges that had been 
dormant during the Cold War era. Without doubt, Turkey played a positive role in 
solving such problems. Turkey was actively involved in efforts, at both bilateral and 
international levels, to find a just and permanent solution to such security disputes. In 
addition to that, Turkey actively participated in military humanitarian interventions by 
contributing considerable amount of military force, by sharing the economic burden of 
these security problems, and by accepting a substantial number of refugees.260  
Bosnia is a good example of Turkey’s role in Western security. Before the 
military intervention in Bosnia started, the Turkish government received a lot of public 
criticism for not doing enough. Despite strong public pressure to pursue a more 
assertive, unilateral policy,261 Turkey aligned its policy with the overall framework 
created by its major Western allies and the UN Security Council. Consequently, in 1993, 
after the intervention started, Turkey contributed a squadron of F-16s to support NATO 
operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. It provided 1,500 soldiers to the 
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Implementation Force (IFOR), the UN-led peacekeeping force, and later 1,000 soldiers 
to the Stabilization Force (SFOR), which is still there. Furthermore, Turkey is the main 
partner of the US-initiated “equip and train” program for the Bosnian Federation Army. 
The United States provides military equipment and Turkey provides training.262  
 Other than participating in peacekeeping/peacemaking missions, Turkey is also 
a strong promoter of regional cooperation for security and stability. In this regard, it 
signed a number of bilateral agreements in all fields of cooperation, including "The 
Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security." with Bulgaria, 
Albania, Romania, and Macedonia.263 It has taken the lead in establishing a 
multinational peacekeeping force in the Balkans (the Southeast European Brigade, or 
SEEBRIG)-comprising units from Turkey, Greece, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Macedonia, and Albania. Upon the invitation of the German presidency of the EU, 
Turkey participated in the political directors meeting in Bonn/Petersberg on 27 May 
1999 where the stability pact for Southeastern Europe was drafted.264 Consequently, in 
Cologne, 10 June 1999, with those countries “who seek integration into Euro-Atlantic 
structures” Turkey signed the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe which aims at 
“strengthening countries in South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, 
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democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity, in order to achieve 
stability in the whole region.”265  
Complementary to its relations with Balkan states aimed at providing stability 
and security for the region, Turkey is supporting the creation of multilateral regional 
political and economic cooperation plans. With its functioning institutions, the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project stands out as the most comprehensive 
regional economic cooperation effort in the region. Although it did not develop as 
envisaged in 1992266 and although it is still far from Turkish expectations that it would 
directly help to stabilize the region. Should it be improved, the BSEC could well be an 
important link between Europe and Central Asia and even an instrument for conflict 
resolution and regional stabilization.267    
4.3. Turkish Policy toward the ESDP 
The end of the Cold War raised a lot of concerns in Turkish security and defense 
policy-making circles since the main threat to Europe’s existence gone, and Europe’s 
redefinition of its new security architecture could exclude Turkey. For this reason, 
Turkey initially supported the creation of a European security and defense identity since 
it would be developed within the framework of NATO, of which it is a full member.  
Indeed, Turkey could manage to influence the developments in the European 
security and defense identity. For example, during the discussions of the CJTF Concept, 
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one of the most significant Alliance adaptations along with the “deputy proposal” to 
strengthen the ESDI, Turkey stood firmly against any efforts that could exclude Turkey 
from the decision-making process of the CJTFs if the operation were led by the WEU. 
As far as NATO assets would be involved in the CJTFs, Turkey would fully participate 
in the WEU decision-making.268 Similarly, because of the concerns about the possible 
implications of the developments after St. Malo, Turkey presented the issue to the 
Washington NATO anniversary summit meeting in April 1999. During this meeting, 
Turkey stressed the necessity of its explicit agreement with any decision of the NATO 
council concerning the use of alliance assets for European purposes. Turkish diplomats 
successfully enforced a change in the language of NATO’s New Strategic Concept in 
which this right is implicitly acknowledged by a reference to a ‘case by case’ basis for 
alliance decisions. They also managed to change a paragraph in the Washington 
Communiqué regarding a more independent European role in defense. In both cases, 
Turkey tried to stop what it regarded as the growing exclusion from the emerging 
European security and defense identity.269 
However, the results of St. Malo disappointed Turkey, because in the place of the 
NATO’s ESDI project, the ESDP was set as an EU project of which Turkey is not a part. 
Since it is not a member of the EU, Turkey has no means of influencing the ESDP’s 
evolution. In addition to that, the nearly complete absorption of the WEU into the EU 
structures with no set guidelines for Associate Members deprived Turkey of its acquis 
within the WEU. In Turkish eyes, the worst-case scenario had become a reality and 
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Turkey became increasingly uncomfortable with the developments in the European 
security structure. Turkey tried to influence the process articulating its concerns about 
the developments and appealed to the EU for further improvements in the participation 
of non-EU NATO members in new EU security structures.270 Even the Turkish offer, 
upon EU’s invitation to non-EU European countries, to contribute to the new European 
Union force with a mechanized brigade of up to 5,000 men, 36 F-16 warplanes, two 
transport planes and a small flotilla of ships in return for an important role in planning 
the organization's military operations did not provide the desired results271. 
Meanwhile, it became clear that the EU would not be able to have an 
“autonomous” ESDP outside NATO and would need Turkey’s consent to construct the 
ESDP within the NATO framework. Since, to achieve the required capabilities, Europe 
has to increase its defense spending. For obvious financial and technological reasons that 
was unrealistic. After strong US warnings that an “autonomous” ESDP would make the 
Alliance a “relic” of the past,272 a compromise was reached between the EU and the US. 
The compromise stated that command and planning of such a new European force would 
be done within the NATO structure. In turn, the EU wanted to have an automatic access 
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to command and planning structures of NATO and a list of assets available for an EU-
led operation. However, despite strong pressure from the EU members of the alliance 
and the US as well, Turkey has vetoed such an automatic access to NATO planning 
structures and assets, arguing that these demands are against its security interests and 
contrary to what was agreed upon in the 1999 Washington Summit. This caused some 
tensions in Turkish-EU relations, and still damages the relations particularly because of 
Greece opposition.273  
4.3.1. “02 December 2001”: A turning point for Turkey on ESDP 
On 02 December 2001, the Turkish Prime Ministry Ecevit announced that 
‘Turkey supported the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) process’. The 
reason why Ankara made such a statement was that it has received the assurances it 
demanded about ESDP process as a result of a 'trilateral negotiation text' agreed on by 
the US, Britain and Turkey. This text is also known as ‘Ankara document’ or ‘Ankara 
agreement’ in public. From the outset, Turkey had hoped for 100% success on three key 
issues: 1. To avoid the employment of the rapid reaction forces to be formed as a part of 
the ESDP against itself. 2. To participate in the EU operations in which NATO facilities 
will be employed. 3. To take part in the decision-making processes within the ESDP.  
According to ‘Ankara agreement’, the European army will not be used against 
NATO member countries in a manner threatening their security. For Turkey, this means 
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that European army will not be a party to the Cyprus question, the Aegean problem and 
other conflicts Turkey is engaged in. In other words, it apparently granted Turkey a sort 
of droit de regard, (namely, a guarantee that no decision would be taken against its will 
and without its involvement) in its immediate ‘geographical security environment’.274  
Another Turkish request was to participate in the decision-making mechanism of 
the European army. However, since it was not an EU member a middle path was found. 
Turkey's view will be taken only in 'strategic' operations requiring the use of NATO 
facilities. According to text, NATO’s capabilities and assets are categorized as 
‘strategic’ and ‘non-strategic’, and for accessing to strategic ones (including air refueling 
and lift, intelligence, and command, control and communications) EU would need 
approval from NAC while non-strategic ones (which presumably include SHAPE- 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) are accessible automatically. If the EU-
led operation will be taken place in a region close to Turkey and the operation can affect 
Turkey’s vital security concerns directly, Ankara will participate in a pre-operation 
‘reinforced consultation’ system. Therefore, Turkey will reportedly be given a say and 
the right to participate in operations in its region. If Turkey will participate in this 
operation actively with military units, it has the equal statue in decision-making 
process.275 
The document has eased Turkey's concerns on the above-mentioned issues since 
it contains a number of guarantees concerning sensitive and disputed issues. The US and 
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all EU member states, except Greece, have reportedly been satisfied with Turkey's 
decision to accept the European Security and Defense Policy in principle. But, 
meanwhile, Greece has declared that it would veto to the agreement made between 
Turkey, Britain and the US, the aim of which was to solve the issue of the future 
European Security and Defense Policy. Greek government spokesman Hristo Protopapas 
claimed that binding decisions for the ESDP were still the ones taken at Nice Summit. In 
addition, he stated that the decisions of one government within the EU would not be 
binding for Greece, apparent referring to Britain's assurances to Turkey on the ESDP. 
Greece postponed the accord at the Laeken Summit in December 2001 in which ESDP 
was declared as ‘operational’. As a result, Greece successfully prevented it from 
becoming the EU’s official position. 
All of the EU member countries accepted this arrangement, except Greece, 
which is still balking. Athens is arguing that no non-EU country can be in a position to 
be able to influence EU military decisions, even if that country belongs to NATO. In 
rejecting the “Ankara agreement”, Greece signaled that it couldn’t tolerate the 
diplomatic advantage that Turkey had gained with the support of all the other EU 
members. As long as Greece continues to reject the Ankara agreement and exercise its 
veto, this issue cannot be considered a finished deal for Turkey and the concerns of 
Turkey about the future of ESDP will endure. 276     
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4.3.2. Turkey’s concerns about the ESDP 
Along with the US, Turkey has been the most vocal country in the Alliance, 
warning the EU about the ESDP issue. From the beginning, Turkey wanted non-EU 
European allies to be involved in the new EU security and defense structures. After the 
EU accelerated the “autonomous” ESDP movement, Turkey supported the US position 
warning the EU about “the three D’s”: Decoupling, Duplication, and Discrimination. 
Since “discrimination” is particularly related to Turkey, its warnings and objections 
focused on the participation of non-EU NATO allies in the ESDP. Turkey shares the 
general concerns that the other non-EU NATO members have.  
In addition to concerns regarding “the three D’s,” which are to varying degrees 
shared by non-EU Allies, there are some other basic concerns that are shared by Turkey 
and other non-EU NATO members. Considering the latest developments, the ESDP 
seems to affect Turkey more than any other member of the Alliance. For a better 
understanding, the rest of this chapter deals with particular Turkish concerns and 
objections pertaining to the ESDP.277 
4.3.2.1. ‘Duplication’ and ‘Participation’  
With the Helsinki Headline Goal, an army which has the capability to deploy 
60,000 troops anywhere in the world within one month and to sustain themselves for at 
least one year, the EU wants to have a military capability with a global reach in order to 
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protect the interests of the Union wherever considered necessary on the globe, in the role 
of a “global superpower”.278 
To implement such goals, the EU will need strategically military assets, such as 
C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) and ISTAR (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance). In order to avoid duplication of 
forces and efforts in the same geographical area, the EU requests the authorization to 
have automatic and uninterrupted access to the military assets of NATO. At this point, 
since Turkey fears that the future EU-led military operations may well challenge its 
supreme national interests and security, it blocked the EU’s request of assured access to 
NATO assets. The geographical location of Turkey is a difficult region close to the 
major crisis areas in which most probable conflict scenarios could be taken place. 
Therefore, without Turkey’s active participation, both in planning and in the operational 
phases, EU-led operations may severely damage Turkey’s interests. Furthermore, there 
is also the possibility of an EU military intervention going out of control during the 
conflict and paving the way for an Article V contingency, which would formally pull 
Turkey into the conflict, because of its NATO membership, and then Turkey have to 
become involved in a conflict that it had no responsibility for. Therefore, Turkey has 
been insisting on being admitted to the decision-making mechanism, whenever NATO 
assets would be called into action, and especially when the EU conducted operations in 
the region close to Turkey.279 
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The developments since the British initiative and the Cologne Declaration on a 
common security and defense policy have significantly changed the current European 
security and defense structure. With the absorption of WEU structures into the EU, the 
debate on participation of WEU Associate Members in the decision-making process for 
EU-led Petersberg operations has become a question of including them in the new ESDP 
framework.  
Involving WEU Associate Members in the new ESDP framework has been of 
great concern, especially for Turkey. Of the Associate members, Turkey has taken the 
most obvious position.280 It seems that the political involvement of Iceland and Norway 
in such operations does not matter much as long as they are fully informed on 
developments. Iceland’s unique position–it does not have any armed forces–gives it 
greater flexibility in its approach to the issue. Furthermore, Iceland and Norway have no 
intention of becoming EU members, for the time being. Therefore, in principle, they are 
not enthusiastic about having that kind of relationship with the EU.281 
Regarding to the new three Associate Members, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland, three countries with a clear prospect of EU full-membership, they clearly do 
not have to worry about total exclusion from EU affairs. Nevertheless, any arrangement 
that will provide them with the means for further involvement in the ESDP framework 
in this transitionary period, before their full membership of the EU, will undoubtedly 
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contribute to their capabilities for interoperability and harmonization with the EU in this 
field.282 
For the “other” Associate Member, Turkey, the issue is more complicated. 
Lacking the prospect of full membership of the EU, and being geostrategically located in 
a difficult region close to the major areas of crisis which might constitute potential zones 
for the exercise of Petersberg missions, Turkey apparently has different concerns:  
What NATO identifies as major risks and threats can be found in the 
areas surrounding Turkey: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
religious fundamentalism, illicit arms and drugs trafficking, political 
unrest, international terrorism and mass movement of refugees. 
Furthermore, six of these situations call for Turkey direct involvement. 
Therefore, in this changed strategic environment, Turkey is concerned 
with suggestions of regional solutions or of the predominance of non-
Article five operations. Turkey is not a country in the central part of 
Europe that enjoys the safety and security of its borders.283 
 
This statement clearly points out Turkey’s grounds for seeking further 
involvement in all European security arrangements. Consequently, participation in the 
planning and implementing of all Petersberg-type operations that could happen in these 
major troubled areas is of great importance for Turkey–not only as a NATO ally, but 
also as a regional actor whose interests will inevitably be affected by further 
developments. Therefore, Turkey supports its reason more vigorously regarding 
participation in the decision-making process of EU-led operations or any future 
arrangements made within the ESDP framework. It does so, unlike some nations, 
because these issues are crucial to its national interests.284    
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In Helsinki in 1999, the European Council declared Turkey as a candidate for 
full membership of the EU, and declared that it would be given a pre-accession strategy 
without addressing any dates or perspectives in detail. Yet Turkey’s full membership in 
the EU still remains a remote possibility. In these circumstances, the participation of 
WEU Associate Members in the ESDP framework becomes especially significant for 
Turkey when compared with other Associate Members.  
At the Nice Summit, the EU decided upon the models for participation in EU-led 
military operations and their decision-making processes. The model foresees two 
consultation meetings per presidency in peacetime. The non-EU allies will participate in 
operations, but within the framework of the “committee of contributors”, which does not 
bear any responsibility for the strategic control and political direction of the operation. 
This means that even when an EU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities, the 
EU does not provide Turkey with the right to participate in the strategic control and 
political direction of the operation.285 Therefore, the lacks and unacceptable structure of 
EU model for participation prove why Turkey has been insisting on being admitted to 
the decision-making mechanism. 
4.3.2.2. Preserving the acquis within the WEU 
Turkish objections to the ESDP focus on preserving the legal and political acquis 
they had within the WEU structure. As an associate member it enjoyed all the 
possibilities of participation in WEU activities from the biweekly meetings of the WEU 
council and having five officers on duty in the defense planning cell to the participation 
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of Turkish Parliamentarians in the WEU assembly, which met twice a year. The only 
exception, although important, was the exclusion from decision-making in the WEU 
council and the exclusion from the collective defense clause of the Brussels Treaty.  
Even the dispute about Turkey’s inclusion in WEU decision-making in case of 
using the CJTFs was solved: As far as NATO assets would be used in CJTF’s Turkey 
would fully participate in WEU decision-making. Furthermore, Turkey was a full 
embodied and entitled member in one of the WEU’s sub-organizations, the Western 
European Armaments Group (WEAG)— just as all NATO members. 
However, after the WEU Council existed and the WEU’s functions were 
transferred to the EU Council, it was not clear if WEU Associate Members would have 
any input into the decision-making process, or even if they would be consulted at any 
stage of the EU-ESDP discussions. For Turkey in particular, this is a cause of concern. 
Clearly, Turkey would like to have assurances at this stage, namely, that its 
political, institutional and legal acquis within the WEU be preserved. The Western 
European Armaments Group, Eurocom and Eurolongterm were originally bodies within 
NATO, and were transferred to the WEU. In these cases, Turkey was already a full 
member and participant. So, as a Turkish scholar asked “Once these institutions of the 
WEU became absorbed into the EU, will Turkey’s legal acquis in these bodies cease to 
exist?”.286 On the other hand, Turkey also had a political acquis within the WEU, as it 
held in the WEU Council since 1992. For example, Turkey was also a signatory to the 
WEU Declaration on the EU Amsterdam Treaty. From the Turkish perspective, the 
                                                 
286 Gülnur Aybet, “NATO’s Developing Role in Collective Security,”. See also Gülnur Aybet and Meltem 
Müftüler-Baç, “Transformations in Security and identity after the Cold War ”, International Journal, 
Autumn 2000, pp.580-581 
118 
absorption of the WEU into the 2nd Pillar of the EU presented problems regarding the 
status of its legal and political acquis within the WEU, since Turkey has no participation 
in the ESDP process.287  
4.3.2.3. Strategic balance with Greece  
Another cause of concern for Turkey would be the possible impact of changes in 
the European security and defense architecture to the relationships between Turkey and 
Greece.  
Turkey was concerned that it would have to confront all of Europe when it had a 
problem with Greece. Turkey pointed out that Greece could use the EU to put pressure 
on some bilateral security problems, especially on Cyprus. As a Turkish scholar, Erol 
Manisalı put it:  
The EU will have the opportunity to pressure Turkey concerning her 
relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration by using the 
ESDP, as the Aegean and the island of Cyprus will be seen within the 
boundaries of the EU. Even today it is considered as such. The "strategic 
balance" between Turkey and Greece will be altered completely, while 
Greece is both in NATO and the ESDP, and Turkey participates only in 
NATO. Greece will begin to use the EU militarily against Turkey.288 
 
The EU’s more assertive attitude toward Cyprus problem also fueled the growing 
concerns. Assuming that it would be a “catalyst effect” in the Cyprus problem, the EU 
declared that it could offer a full membership to the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus even 
though the conflict remained unresolved. This situation has been criticized by some 
member states, as Thomas Diez noted:  
                                                 
287 Ibid. 
288 Erol Manisalı “Europe Forming Its Own Army, Turkey Excluded,” Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, Apr 24, 
1999. Available at  http://www.turkey.org/news99/e042899.htm accessed on Oct 15, 2000. 
119 
The Cypriot membership may alter the strategic environment of east 
Mediterranean to the extent that the EU’s foreign policy and defense 
dimensions are strengthened in the coming years, with the formerly non-
aligned Cyprus becoming part of a European security and defense identity, 
while NATO member Turkey may have to remain outside for the time 
being….289   
 
The military capability of Greece on the Aegean islands, which should have 
remained demilitarized according to Lausanne Treaty, is still a matter of concern for the 
Turkish military. Greece has a strategic advantage over Turkey because of several Greek 
islands which have small-scale airbases in the Aegean. Therefore, in a probable crisis 
that may result in a war between Turkey and Greece, Turkey has to balance the strategic 
advantage of Greece. This balance is obtained with the Turkish ability to invade Cyprus 
completely. Turkish political and security elite believes that its ability to invade the 
whole of Cyprus helps maintain the strategic balance of power with Greece and provides 
it with a strong sense of security. But, this strategic balance may collapse in the case of 
the accession of the Greek Cypriots to the EU since the European Army will have to 
defend Greek Cypriot territory which will then become the territory of the EU. 290 
On the contrary, there are also good reasons for Turkey to believe that these 
developments will not have any effect on its relationship with Greece. The EU 
countries’ traditional approach to the Turkey-Greece problems presently remains neutral 
since both countries are NATO members.  
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The second paragraph of Part III-A of the Petersberg Declaration stressed that 
the security guarantees and defense commitments in the treaties which bind the Member 
States within WEU and NATO were mutually reinforcing and would not be invoked by 
those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between Member 
States of either of the two organizations.291 To put it clearly, this clause was included to 
prevent non-EU member NATO countries and EU full members from using the 
guarantees provided under these organizations against each other in disputes among 
themselves. Under the tenets of this declaration despite Greece’s objections, EU 
countries maintained their “neutral” position vis-à-vis Turkish-Greek disputes.292  
4.3.2.4. Dilution of NATO membership 
Another cause of concern for Turkey is related to Turkey’s EU vocation. Turkey 
has always seen its relations with the European Union (EC-before 1993) as a natural 
complement to its relations with NATO. Indeed, in many respects the 1963 Ankara 
agreement was a result of the Turkish NATO membership. With this agreement, Turkey 
became an associate member of the EC, expecting that someday it would eventually 
become a full member of the EC. Turkey’s ties to the EC were enhanced in 1970 by the 
Additional Protocol, which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union between 
Turkey and the EC. Relations with the EC, however, were always seen by Turkey in a 
broader political context—as part of the wider effort to Westernize Turkish society and 
complete the Atatürk revolution.293  
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Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War significantly changed the context for 
Turkish membership. Prior to the collapse of the Wall, Turkey’s problems with the EC 
were primarily economic. Afterward they broadened as the EC (later the EU) began to 
put greater emphasis on political, social, and cultural factors. As Gülnur Aybet has 
noted,  
“Not only the parameters of European security but also those of 
European culture were being redefined, as the division of Europe ceased to 
exist and Europe—east and west—was finding new grounds for bonding in 
historical, cultural, and religious terms.”294  
 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War changed the primacy of institutions in 
Europe. The EU became more prominent and NATO more complimentary. For many 
years, Turkey saw its place in the European security system as proof of its 
Europeanness. NATO membership has formed the legitimacy of this argument. Turkey 
has seen its position in NATO and the European defense system as evidence and 
justification for the necessity of its being in European institutions and as a ultimate 
guarantee of EU membership. After all, Europe’s security needs in the Cold War had 
made Turkey a part of the European security system. Therefore, Turks have seen the 
inclusion in the ESDP as a “litmus test” of the EU’s willingness to accept Turkey as an 
EU member. Because of its geostrategic importance, security issues were considered the 
first arena on which the EU countries would be willing to cooperate with Turkey.  
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On the subject of concerns of Turkey, statements of Turkish former ambassador 
to NATO reflect the viewpoint of most Turkish scholars and politicians, and enlighten 
the issue briefly: 
“We are not against a larger international role for the EU since it is in our 
interest to join an organization which plays an even more important role than it 
does today. But we are against arrangements that would give us a second-class 
status. At present, as a member of NATO, Turkey has full rights in all NATO 
initiatives and operations concerning European security. We believe that another 
European security initiative in which we will have less opportunity, less power, 
and less influence is not a good offer. We believe that there should not be any 
dividing lines between the EU member states and those that are candidates for 
membership. Similarly, we believe that there should not be two or more levels of 
security among NATO countries in Europe. The European pillar of NATO is not 
the European Union; it is the European allies, all European allies of NATO, 
including Turkey, Norway, Poland, the Czech Republic and Iceland. There are 
six European countries that are not yet members of the EU and we cannot 
exclude them while talking about the European pillar of NATO.” 295 
Another problem could arise from the possibility that some central and European 
states would be granted EU membership before Turkey. Because all of these new EU 
members would automatically become a part of ESDP as well, they would have a higher 
status in European security affairs over a staunch, long-standing NATO ally.296 
Likewise, if automatic access to NATO planning capabilities is granted to EU, as EU 
wanted, this will also involve the non-NATO EU states (so-called “neutrals” and “non-
aligned states”), notably Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Austria, in NATO planning 
mechanisms. In the Turkish view, this is another unacceptable consequence of granting 
automatic access to the EU while Turkey is being excluded from ESDP structure.297  
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4.3.2.5. The need for ‘collective defense’ guarantee: 
One of the important concerns Turkey has, though it has an indirect effect on the 
discussion of the ESDP, is related to its need to NATO’s collective defense guarantees. 
Russia is no longer a systemic adversary, but it still causes more security concerns for 
Turkey than for any other European country. Admittedly, there is no longer a direct 
Russian military threat since there is no shared border between the two countries. In 
addition, Russia has become one of the leading economic partners of Turkey. And 
Turkey relies heavily on Russia for its growing imports of natural gas. Compared to the 
Cold War, one could say that Turkey feels much less threatened by Russia today. 
However, Russia’s continuing involvement in violent Caucasian and Transcaucasion 
conflicts poses the possibility of Russian-Turkish conflicts, given the links that bound 
Turkey to many countries in the region. Furthermore, Russian troops continue to be 
stationed at Turkey’s borders with Armenia and Georgia, which disturbs Turkish 
security circles. Turkey’s concerns were further fueled by Russia’s success at achieving 
some change in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty regulations about the 
amount of military forces and equipment in the flank zones, thereby making Turkey the 
most exposed member of the alliance to the “residual threat” of the collapsed Soviet 
Union.298 
The rivalry between the Turkey and Russia over the newly independent Central 
Asian states, the unresolved issue of oil and gas pipelines in the Caspian region and 
Turkmenistan, and the Russian S-300 deal with Cyprus have also been other issues of 
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tension in the two countries’ relations.299 Additionally, Turkey is uneasy with the 
increased ship traffic after the oil transportation from the Russian harbor of Novorossiisk 
started since it poses a serious environmental threat to its most crowded city, Istanbul.300 
Turkey signaled that it would make further regulations on the passage through the 
straits, to which Russia ostensibly objects. Therefore, the straits will likely be another 
issue of discussion between these countries in the coming years. 
In addition to a “residual threat” stemming from Russia, with its exposure to the 
weapons of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, and ethnic conflicts in its 
surroundings, Turkey is also regarded the most threatened member of the alliance. 
Apparently, the end of the Cold War has also brought a divergence in security needs of 
alliance members. Taking it as a potential threat to the cohesion of the Alliance, Rob De 
Wick introduces the issue of different “zones of security,” which emerged in the 
Alliance region after the Cold War:   
Turkey, which is in the zone of “maximum danger,” will 
undoubtedly have a different threat perception than the Netherlands, which 
is the zone of “maximum peace.” Turkey is likely to put more emphasis on 
NATO’s traditional collective defense tasks, while the Netherlands will 
emphasize NATO’s crisis response operations, including peacekeeping. 301  
 
Yet defining Turkey’s status within this new institutional development is not just 
a matter of institutional membership status. There are also practical considerations over 
security interests. As noted earlier, in Petersberg-type operations, it is likely that for the 
foreseeable future, any crisis to emerge is likely to occur in a region of close proximity 
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to Turkey, as Turkey’s geo-strategic setting is surrounded by turbulent regions, from the 
Balkans, the Caucasus to the Middle East. Therefore, any Petersberg-type operation to 
be deliberated within the EU Council in relation to these regions will have a direct 
bearing on Turkey’s national security interests. This is an important consideration. 
Already there is a feeling in Turkish decision-making circles that NATO’s European 
Allies are less sensitive to Turkish security concerns than the United States.302 For 
example, there is less sympathy from Northern Europe to the threats Turkey faces from 
regional proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, whereas the United States has 
been more responsive to Turkey’s demands for Allied support and cooperation in this 
context.303  
All of these considerations tie in directly to the status of Turkey within the 
evolving ESDP. Therefore, the need to define Turkey’s status and role in this structure 
and to find ways to tie Turkey to new structures as soon as possible are not only 
beneficial for Turkey’s interests but also for the interests of its European Allies. 
4.3.3. Turkey’s possible contributions to the ESDP: 
Turkey lies in an unpredictable and unstable geographical position. Although the 
future ESDP is likely to take a global view of security issues, its major theatres of 
operation are likely to be in problem areas in and around Europe. NATO’s work on 
potential scenarios points to 16 potential areas for the deployment of the Rapid Reaction 
Force. As mentioned earlier, thirteen of these hot spots lie around Turkey and thus 
critically affect the Turkey’s security. Therefore, Turkey's contributions to conflict 
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prevention and crisis management, in political, financial and military terms, have been 
considerable. 
Turkey’s possible strategic contributions to European security could be in many 
areas and on many significant issues that affect directly or indirectly the success of 
ESDP in particular and the maintenance of global security in general.304 
First of all, Turkey has a large, modern and efficient army, the second strongest 
armed forces in NATO. Turkey’s military capabilities are presently superior to those of 
most of its neighbors and of NATO member states. It can mobilize large forces and 
maintain a high degree of readiness for a considerable length of time. Its industrial base 
is now capable of producing a good proportion of its military hardware requirements.305 
Furthermore, Turkish military personal are so knowledgeable and skilled in conducting 
low-intensity military operations since their significant experience in struggle against 
PKK terrorists. With its experienced army, Turkey, which committed more troops than 
10 EU countries to the EU Headline Goal, can easily carry out Petersberg-type 
operations and contribute European army more than any other European force.306 
Second, Turkey is located in adjacent region where many important problematic 
areas to Europe exist. Turkey’s geostrategic position and its NATO-standard military 
infrastructure and logistic support are so important to reflect the power-projection of 
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Europe to these areas. In other words, Turkey in ESDP means the expanded range of 
European force. The significant role of ‘İncirlik’ airbase during the Gulf crisis in 1990s 
is a good example to express the importance of its location and its military capabilities. 
From the operational standpoint, the Turkish military has gained experience in mobility 
and sustainability in hostile environments in the Northern Iraq operations. Turkey has a 
lot to contribute to the capability of EU’s projection of military power, which mostly 
depends on the transport and sustainability of the troops on the ground.307 Not only is it a 
member of NATO, but also its geostrategic location means that many possible EU-led 
crisis management operations are likely to be within Turkey’s strategic purview. 
Therefore, various operations would benefit from, or even require, the active 
cooperation of experienced Turkey.  
Third, Turkey has a large energetic young population while the population of 
European states getting older rapidly. In foreseeable future, Europe will need young 
people used for both economic and military areas. Therefore, the necessity of Turkish 
army with skilled youthful person will increase for Petersberg-type operations mainly 
based on well-educated manpower.308   
Fourth, from a strategic perspective, Turkish involvement in EU-led operations 
may bring additional credibility to EU efforts, especially if the operations taken place in 
the eastern Balkans or the Middle East, since Turkey’s historical ties and political, 
cultural, and religious affinities with the peoples of the region. In this way, to put it more 
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concretely, Turkish involvement would eliminate the perception of the EU force as a 
‘crusader’ army.309 
Fifth, Europe supplies its oil requirements mostly from the province neighboring 
Turkey. Turkey is situated geographically on the route of strategic energy resources 
coming from the Middle East, Caspian Sea and Central Asia region. Mostly Turkey has 
been providing the security of these lines.310 On the other hand, Bakü-Ceyhan pipeline 
project has also greater importance for receiving oil and gas reserves in future.  
Sixth, Turkey’s geographical position makes it more sensitive than the Western 
European states to the threats of WMD.311 Today, it seems that there is no a direct threat 
to European states regarding to WMD. However, there is a growing alertness of the 
efforts of many states, especially rogue states, to obtain the components of weapons of 
mass destruction and the means of delivery. These states also continued to actively build 
a WMD arsenal, and enhance range of weapons by improving delivery systems. After a 
short time, Europe will be under the threat of WMD mostly originated from the rogue 
states in the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey will be among those countries taking an 
active interest in initiatives on counter-proliferation policy and ballistic missile defenses 
(BMD)312, and Turkey’s geographical location is the most suitable place for positioning 
such defense systems. 
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 Seventh, from the economic and technological aspect of ESDP, Turkish military 
industry base, with the advanced degree of cooperation through the US and Israel, would 
certainly provide a positive outcome for an integrated European military industry.313 
Finally, it is likely that for the foreseeable future, ESDP will not be limited only 
by Petersberg-type operations. Europe will need Turkey for its collective defense 
(Art.V) functions. This will result in growing importance of Turkey in European eyes.314 
As a conclusion remark, if the EU and Turkey are able to find a constructive 
solution, the result could contribute to the stability of a volatile region; strengthening 
ESDP; and speeding up the accession process of Turkey. Finally, a meaningful and 
functional EU-Turkey security arrangement can be an important building block in the 
reorientation of the transatlantic link.315 
4.4.   Turkey, the US, and the EU: A Triangular Relationship:  
An important factor that always has an impact on Turkey’s relations with Europe 
is Turkey’s relations with the US. Considering the special relationship developed 
between the two nations in the post-Cold War , it would not be wrong to argue that the 
relations between Turkey and the US is likely to have an impact on Turkey’s position in 
the European security system.   
During the Cold War, the US, Western Europe, and Turkey had a common 
foreign and security policy as mentioned earlier. All three maintained an overwhelming 
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priority on responding to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the end 
of the Cold War changed the security interests of these countries. The essential 
difference between the US and Europe in the analysis of post-Cold War  security 
challenges is that the US shares with Turkey a view that security must be increasingly 
seen on a trans-regional basis while the countries of the European Union concentrate, 
primarily if not exclusively, on problems of European security.316 This has implications 
not only for the scope of the CFSP and the ESDP but also for NATO and for the future 
cooperation between Western Europe, Turkey, and the US within that structure.  
For the US, Turkey is in the unusual position of being both a contributor to 
European security in a formal Alliance context and a partner in addressing wider 
problems influencing European, Middle Eastern, and Eurasian security, most of which 
lie outside the NATO area. Turkey is an “attractive international partner for 
multilateralists and unilateralists alike.”317 US public rhetoric has affirmed Turkey's 
strategic significance in the post-Cold War era. In the earlier part of the Clinton 
administration, US officials emphasized Turkey's role as a "front-line state" that is "at 
the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian 
continent"318 More recently, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott asserted that US-
Turkish relations have "even more of a hardheaded, geopolitical, strategic rationale in 
the post-Cold War period than . . . during the Cold War ."319 As Makovsky points out: 
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Post-Cold War Turkey is an important ally for the United States. Its 
manifold strategic roles are now widely recognized: a moderate, pro-
Western state in an unstable area; a rare, probably unique, example of 
democracy, however flawed, in a Muslim-majority state; a supporter of 
Israeli-Palestinian peace and a pace-setter in Islamic world normalization 
with Israel; a base for Operation Northern Watch, which enforces a no-fly 
zone in northern Iraq, a key element of Washington's Iraq strategy; an 
ideological counterweight to Iran; a buffer against resurgence of Russian 
aggression; a forceful but pacific and anti-separatist advocate of the causes 
of besieged Muslims in its region (Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Kosovo), all of whose kin are liberally represented in Turkey's population 
mix; an important, non-Russian line of communication with the West, and 
to some extent a role model, for the still-unsteady Turkic-language states of 
the former Soviet Union; and a potential outlet for Caspian Sea energy 
resources as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes.320 
 
Although Turkey’s transregional position makes it a valuable partner for the US, 
which has global commitments and interests, the same factor causes Turkey to be left 
out of regional European security arrangements. The EU, at least for now, does not want 
serious security problems and “rogue states” on its borders.321 Many Europeans fear that 
Turkish membership in the ESDP would expose them to new risks and could import 
Middle East conflicts into the EU. As a strategic analyst noted back in the beginning of 
the 1990’s: 
As the half-century imperative of containing Soviet power wanes, 
Europe has lost a great deal of its interest in the strategic engagement of 
Turkey. Indeed, as Europe looks to the creation of its own defense identity, 
there is a risk that Turkey will be seen as a strategic and political liability: a 
strategic liability because of its complex and immediate security concerns; a 
political liability because of its position outside the European Community 
[then] and its close bilateral relationship with the United States.322  
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However, the US wants to see Turkey in the European security system. One of 
the US objections to the ESDP, “discrimination”, as mentioned earlier particularly 
applies to Turkey. The top American officials insistently breach the issue of the 
participation of non-EU NATO allies into the new EU security and defense structures.323 
The NATO officials and the US support the Turkish position toward the ESDP and push 
Europeans to find a solution to relieve Turkey’s concerns. 
Although Europe might have the capabilities to deal with contingencies such as 
small-scale conflicts and peacekeeping missions, at least for the foreseeable future, 
Europe will not have the capabilities and forces that will relieve it from reliance on the 
US. For the other threats identified in NATO’s strategic concept, such as large-scale 
peacekeeping/peacemaking, ethnic conflicts, WMD, drug trafficking, religious 
fundamentalism and energy security, Europe still needs the US and NATO.324 The same 
defense and security needs are also relevant, by virtue of its geostrategic position, vis-a-
vis Turkey. Henceforth, even if the EU rejects to give Turkey a role in the ESDP, it 
would still need Turkey for its collective defense and security as it needs NATO and the 
US as well. Therefore, it is unlikely that the EU will ignore Turkey as a security and 
defense partner and will be unresponsive to its demands.325 EU’s messages to Turkey 
seem to justify this view. The messages conveyed by the top officials of the EU and the 
ESDP to Turkish officials aimed to relieve Turkey of its concerns by giving assurances 
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that one way or another Turkey will definitely have a link with the ESDP and its 
sensitivities will be considered.326  
4.5. Concluding Remarks: 
Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has found itself in a central position in the 
geopolitical environment that stretches from the Adriatic Sea to western China and is 
characterized by varied security challenges, such as radical nationalism, irredentism, 
religious extremism, and extreme forms of the expression of the ethnicity. On the one 
hand, this has increased Turkey’s importance in international politics, but, on the other, 
it has highlighted Turkey’s ‘distinctiveness’ vis-à-vis Europe, and implied Turkey as an 
additional security burden as some Western European allies perceive.327 
Post Cold War challenges of international system give us indications about the 
role of Turkey in the emerging security structures. In Petersberg type operations, it is 
likely that for the foreseeable future, any crisis to emerge is likely to occur in a region of 
close proximity to Turkey, since Turkey’s geo-strategic setting is surrounded by 
turbulent regions, from the Balkans to the Caucasus and the Middle East. With its 
location at an intersection point, Turkey's contributions to conflict prevention and crisis 
management, in political, financial and military terms, have been considerable. Turkey 
intends to continue and to strengthen its involvement in future EU-led crisis 
management efforts.328  
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Turkey is not against a larger international role for EU. But Turkey is against 
arrangements that would give it a second-class status. From the Turkish perspective, the 
absorption of the WEU into the 2nd Pillar of the EU presents problems regarding the 
status of its legal and political acquis of with the WEU, since Turkey has no 
participation in the ESDP process. Turkey strongly believes that the acquis, which was 
accumulated within the WEU, should be preserved.329 
Finally, in order to shed light on the positions of Turkey vis-à-vis Europe on the 
subject of emerging ESDP, quotation from a speech given by NATO Secretary General, 
Lord Robertson at a conference in Istanbul, is very notable: 
" …First, the political point. It is a very simple and straightforward 
point: we all need Turkey. Its proximity to the Balkans, the Caucasus, the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean puts Turkey at the center of a vital 
strategic area.  
…The second point is a military one. Even a quick glance at a list of 
conceivable scenarios for EU-led crisis management operations drives the 
conclusion that virtually all these scenarios involve Turkey, in one way or 
another. Simply put: if the crisis is very serious, NATO will be involved -- 
and that includes Turkey. If the crisis is less prone to escalation, but still 
requires a significant amount of force, then the EU may lead, but only with 
the help of NATO. Again, Turkey will also be involved. If the crisis is at 
the lower end of the spectrum, the EU may act autonomously but will want 
to take into account eventual contributions by Turkey.  
In any case, Turkey needs to be involved -- because NATO assets 
are required, because Turkish contributions are needed, or because the 
operation takes place in a region close to Turkey. In other words, the 
military realities of crisis management will ensure that Turkey will play a 
role commensurate with its weight as a major security actor."330  
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CONCLUSION: 
 
This study is an attempt firstly to assess the evolution of the EU security 
structure from the Cold War period to the present days, and its possible political and 
security impacts on Turkey. The main objective of this study was to concentrate on the 
reasons and motives behind the emerging EU security structure, and its outcomes for 
both the EU and NATO. The national interests and driving forces behind the EU 
members; the recent discussions that cover the latest developments affecting ESDP; and 
the main controversies and challenges about the creation of a military foundation were 
explored in this context from a causal perspective.  
In this regard, what the perspectives of main actors of world security structure, 
namely the US and Russia, and how ESDP affects those nations that are non-EU NATO 
members, particularly Turkey, were the questions in need of being answered from the 
point of both Euro-Atlantic security considerations and Turkish national security 
concerns.   
First of all, ESDP is considered as a significant step in providing the capabilities 
necessary for Europe to assume a larger role in world politics, particularly in security 
matters. Today, it is obviously a fact that as a sovereign political entity -with a 
parliament, a ministerial council, a full-fledged bureaucracy, and a flag and a banknote 
in circulation- the EU desires to establish a military unit of its own under the framework 
of ESDP.331  
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From the time when the foundation of NATO, the debate over a European force 
that would strengthen the European pillar of the alliance has never ended. Since the first 
attempt to initiate a European Defense Community, in the Cold War period, the 
discussion about a European force has frequently consisted of the same issues: Europe’s 
inability to meet its security and defense needs; Europe’s dependence on the US for its 
defense; Europe’s inability to cooperate and lack of political will; rebalancing the 
burden sharing; keeping the US engaged in European affairs; containing the Soviet 
threat; integrating Germany in the European security system; and determining who 
would be included. 
Whereas, in the post-Cold War era, despite the fact that the existence of Soviet 
threat has vanished, Europeans still talk about similar matters and still do not have 
adequate means to deal with its own security and defense problems.  
The concept of a European-only defense has always been defined differently by 
various nations. Their expectations and goals were always different, yet the main themes 
of the dispute have remained constant. The prospects, aims, and intentions of the 
different players are still various and complex. For example, the UK’s and Germany’s 
perceptions of the ESDP are substantially different from the French perception. While 
the French view the ESDP as a way of decreasing the US influence in European affairs, 
the UK opposes the idea of creating a European defense system completely autonomous 
from the transatlantic alliance. On the other side, the US views the ESDP as a way of 
realizing the long desired fair ‘burden-sharing’ by leading Europeans to create further 
capabilities.  
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Therefore, considering these facts, it would not be wrong to say that despite the 
remarkable changes in the security environment by the end of the Cold War, and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the controversy over the European force has remained the 
same. However, this is not to say that the fate of the ESDP will be as unsuccessful as the 
previous attempts.  
There are many reasons for being optimistic about the future of the ESDP. First, 
the EU’s political will desires an effective ESDP. The EU, as a major economic player 
in the world, wants to secure an equal political role on the international stage to be able 
to defend its members’ interests and to confront any international crisis that affects it. 
Obviously, this could only be possible by being a military power as well as being an 
economic power. To make its voice heard, the EU must put muscle behind it. Second, 
Europe has the resources, means, and economic power to create such a capability if it 
has the political will.332 In an optimistic view, synergies, rationalization, restructuring of 
defense expenditures of EU countries together with its huge economy should be 
sufficient to give the EU the forces it will require for “Petersberg-type” missions, if not 
for a collective defense.  
The third reason to be optimistic about the ESDP is the fundamental change in 
the United Kingdom’s attitude toward the ESDP. A fourth reason is that the continuation 
of the “Kosovo effect.” Kosovo served as a wake-up call for the EU countries showing 
the Europeans that they could not even solve a security problem on their own 
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continent.333 “Kosovo effect” was fundamental motive behind the Europeans’ efforts to 
establish the ESDP and seems to be a permanent factor urging the EU to acquire the 
capabilities and mechanisms for a sound ESDP.  
A fifth reason for optimism is that Europe already has a number of multinational 
force structures for various purposes. Though some of them are still symbolic and some 
of them exist primarily on paper, at least there are some force structures to use as a 
starting point. With an effective planning and rationalization, these forces can be 
gathered to form a future European army.334 The last reason to be optimistic about the 
ESDP is the remarkable progress European countries achieved in the integration and 
unification process. Most authorities realize that future “Unified Europe,” 
“Confederation,” or “United States of Europe” is impossible without a common foreign 
policy and a military power. So, the successes in the other pillars of EU process will be a 
strong impact to establish an autonomous European army to make the EU a stronger 
global player.  
On the other hand, there are also many reasons for being pessimistic about the 
future of the ESDP. At first, the compromise reached between the US and European 
countries at NATO Washington summit clearly constrains the ESDI inside NATO, as 
noted earlier, giving it the right to act, but not to decide autonomously. What is 
suggested is that: ESDI decisions will be discussed by the Atlantic Council, which will 
decide if the matter should be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or left to the EU 
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military action with the help of NATO.335 However, there was no such a commitment to 
the EU that a non-EU NATO member, like Turkey, would not veto these assets for EU-
led operations. So, assured or automatic access to NATO assets, especially to NATO’s 
operational planning capability, seems doubtful under the current circumstances. 
Second, even if there is a political will to establish the ESDP, a considerable gap 
between European and the US capabilities still exists in terms of implementing strategies 
that call for force projection. In some areas the European allies have collectively only 10 
to 15 percent of the assets of the Americans, and sometimes less (e.g. strategic 
reconnaissance).336 In order to implement such a military operation, an army needs many 
means and capabilities, such as deployability and mobility, logistics, effective 
engagement, survivability of forces and infrastructure, command, control and 
information systems. The European countries’ capabilities are simply inadequate to 
carry out the probable missions. 337 Currently, European forces are manpower-intensive 
and unable to be employed, rapidly, at great distances. Taken together, Europeans spend 
less than the US on developing and buying new weapons and equipment and training the 
people who operate them.338 Considering these facts, creating a pool of up to 200,000 
deployable soldiers will be a costly and suspicious task for the EU.339 
The most difficult issue, that has to be solved in the EU framework, is the 
‘resources’ problem. In the light of declining defense budgets of EU countries and 
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constraints imposed by the EMU, reaching these goals at least for the foreseeable future 
is doubtful. It seems unlikely that Europe will have more money to spend. But, like all 
industrialized nations, they are facing enormous pressures to increase social and 
entitlement spending.340  
The latest developments made it clear that if Europeans hope to create an 
“autonomous” ESDP, this cannot be done without creating some level of decoupling, 
duplication, and discrimination. Therefore, “doing it right” became the most important 
point to be considered.  
Common thought is that if it is done right, the ESDP could increase its power 
and could rectify many capability gaps of Europe's. It could further help to rationalize a 
more balanced burden sharing, and could lead to a considerable strategic partnership 
between the EU and NATO. On the other hand, if it is done poorly, this new venture 
could divide the transatlantic Alliance, could diminish the European capacity to manage 
crises, and could weaken Alliance cohesion and solidarity. 
Nevertheless, at least for several years, it seems unlikely for the EU to obtain the 
money and assets for military capabilities that would enable it to deal with Petersberg-
type contingencies. Therefore, NATO, so the US, is expected to continue to be “the only 
game in the town,” not only for collective defense needs but also for collective security 
ones. 
ESDP represents a double-edged sword for Washington. On one hand, American 
military planners and politicians have long been critical of its European allies for not 
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shouldering its own defense responsibilities. On the other hand, the emphasis on a new 
'independent' EU force could undermine the existing partnership of the US with its 
European allies.341  
Even though the US has always welcomed a stronger ‘European pillar’ in the 
NATO, it has been wary of attitudes that would divide the Alliance politically, take 
resources away from NATO military cooperation, and not give way additional military 
capabilities to produce more equitable burden-sharing. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright’s famous “three D”s illustrate the US concerns. In short, Washington does not 
want a decoupling of Europe’s security from that of America’s; a duplication of effort 
and capabilities; or discrimination against those allies outside the EU.  
Europe’s new defense ambitions have not only been concerned about NATO’s 
role and the future of the transatlantic relationship, but also have a serious impact on the 
strategic environment of all Central and East European countries, including Russia. The 
general trend in Moscow’s governmental circles is to welcome the EU’s military plans 
as a step to eliminate US hegemony in Europe and NATO–centrism. From Russian 
perspective, ESDP is seen as a means to block the creation of a unipolar world led by the 
US.342 
The non-EU European NATO members have similar prospects in the ESDP 
process. All give great importance to the transatlantic link. Each country accepts the 
leading role of the US in current international security and each regards the US as the 
essential actor. Consequently, none of them wants to do anything that could be 
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interpreted by the US as weakening the transatlantic link. Each of them wants to use this 
process as a vehicle to advance its interaction in the EU. Each country wants to establish 
inclusive and transparent consultation arrangements as well as involvement in planning 
and decision shaping. Each country wants a multilateral mechanism through which their 
views could be expressed more clearly. Each of them wants to base co-operation in this 
framework on both political and military/operational pillars.343  
As a non-EU NATO member, Turkey has a different position in comparison with 
other European states. Turkey has pledged significant assets and capabilities to the EU's 
Headline Goal. It has an Article-5 security obligation that could be triggered if EU-led 
operations escalate. As long as Europe needs NATO and the US for its collective 
defense, it will also need to consider Turkey’s concerns and demands and try to integrate 
Turkey to the new ESDP structures.  
Assuming that Turkey’s strategic importance for Europe has decreased is wrong. 
Security in the post-Cold War era is no longer identified in terms of building a massive 
collective defense against an identifiable enemy. Instability, national movements, the 
control of natural resources in regions of turmoil all have and are likely to continue to 
have a bearing on European security interests. In this context, Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance for Europe has increased. A country with democratic institutions (which may 
not satisfy the EU criteria for the moment, but are nevertheless democratic), a country 
with a competitive free-market economy, a country which refrains from unilateral action 
in times of crisis and works through institutional and diplomatic channels as part of the 
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Western system, a country which has a long-standing working relationship with Western 
institutions in a region of instability hosting vital strategic natural resources, such as oil 
and gas, has to remain part of the European security architecture; any other alternative 
would be unfavorable to European security interests. 
Turkey believes that non-EU allies ought to have special status in the EU’s 
security and defense planning because of their Article V commitments in the event of a 
crisis escalating, and their readiness to contribute to both NATO and EU-led operations 
with national assets and capabilities. The success of ESDP depends upon the 
synchronization of the security policies of NATO and the EU. It is important to create a 
unitary system for crises management, covering non-EU allies as well as non-NATO EU 
members. Turkey also believes that NATO is still the benchmark of European defense 
with its indispensable principles of collective defense and the transatlantic link.  
As a final point, the ESDP should not be considered just as a zero-sum game 
meaning ‘more EU is equivalent to less NATO’. It should be on mind in every stages of 
emerging ESDP: “Security is indivisible.” 
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